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INTRODUCTION

As consumers, we depend on producersl to guide us through a
maze of complex financial products. 2 We trust them to help us
make the right decisions for ourselves now and for our loved ones
after we are gone. We rely on them to recommend products that
are suitable for us and to make us whole when those products fail to
meet our expectations. A producer's obligation to meet this chal
lenge varies based on a hodgepodge of sometimes inconsistent,
overlapping rules and practices. These vary depending on the state,
type of product, and type of producer. For example, we may re
ceive one type of suitability advice3 from a producer sitting in his
office, but different advice from the same person when he is sitting
in a local bank branch or an office in the next state. The advice
may also vary if it is doled out by cyber agents on the Internet,
television "experts," lawyers, accountants, or even "do it yourself"

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
L.L.M. in Insurance, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., Benjamin N. Car
dozo School of Law, B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, A.I.R.C. &
F.L.M.I., Life Office Management Association (LOMA), c.L.U. & Ch.F.C., The Amer
ican College. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author only.
1. For the purposes of this Article, a "producer" shall refer to any form of agent
or representative engaged, appointed, or designated by an insurance company (referred
to herein as a "manufacturer") in connection with the sale and solicitation of "prod
ucts." Producers may sometimes be categorized as "career agents" (producers who dis
tribute products primarily for a single manufacturer) and "brokers" (producers
appointed by many different manufacturers to distribute their products). These terms
may vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and do not include hybrid relationships
between producers and manufacturers such as person producing general agents
(PPGAs).
2. As used herein, a "product" refers to the life insurance policies or annuity
contracts issued by a manufacturer.
3. "Suitability advice" refers to advice given by a producer as to which products
suit a particular client's needs.
47

48

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:47

financial software programs. The lack of consistency among suita
bility standards confuses and scares most of us. It also causes trepi
dation in producers and manufacturers as "suitability" has evolved
into an after-the-fact way for consumers to hold them responsible
for the consequences of unfavorable investment experiences.
Congress may have envisi.oned a universal suitability standard
when it enacted landmark financial modernization legislation. 4
However, insurance regulators and the insurance industry have thus
far resisted development of a standard that could be used by all
producers. The directive to develop.a universal suitability standard,
along with the emergence of new types of producers who are better
equipped to compete in the absence of such a standard, provides a
strong impetus for the financial services industry5 to either rally be
hind a common benchmark or to have one forced upon them.
Developing a consensus for a universal standard is no easy
task. Resistance to it is fueled, in part, by disagreements about how
or whether such a standard should consider investment outcomes or
be based on a defined and replicable process. Other considerations
involve fundamental questions about the standard of care to which
we should hold producers and whether we should hold customers to
different standards based on their investment acumen. Ultimately,
the answers to these questions will have a significant impact on the
way that products are recommended and the way we view our pro
ducers and manufacturers.
Part I of this Article discusses various approaches to suitability
developed in connection with the sale of traditional and variable
products. 6 Part II briefly explores some of the ways producers have
been held legally accountable for the outcome of "unsuitable" sales.
Part III explores different approaches to developing an appropriate
universal standard.
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
5. For the purposes hereof, the "financial services industry" refers to the business
sector involved in the sale and solicitation of life insurance, annuities, and the provision
of associated investment advice.
6. As used herein, the ~erm "traditional products" refers to life insurance and
annuities in which policy owners or annuitants, as the case may be, do not share in the
investment experience associated with their premiums. Examples of traditional policies
include whole life insurance or fixed annuities. "Variable products" shaH refer to life
insurance policies or annuities that constitute securities within the meaning of the Se
curities Act of 1933, as amended, inasmuch as policy owners and annuitants may desig
nate portions of their premiums to be invested in some form of underlying investment.
Examples of variable products include variable universal life insurance or variable
annuities.
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THE VARIOUS ApPROACHES TO SUITABILITY

The word "suitability" has come to mean different things to
consumers, producers, and regulators. To some it means the pro
cess of exploring investment-related risks based on a customer's fi
nancial sophistication and then recommending" suitable products for
that consumer. To others, any type of suitability analysis is accept
able as long as producers are guided by ethical concepts such as fair
dealing and the provision of clear disclosures. Still others feel that
each solicitation experience is unique and, therefore, no one stan
dard should exist. While each of these arguments has its appeal,
regulators have developed various suitability standards to address
differences among customers, types of producers, solicitation sites,
and types of products.
A.

Customer Specific Suitability
1.

The NASD Non-"Sophisticated" Securities Investor
Suitability Rule

According to the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), "suitability" for the non-"sophisticated" variable prod
uctcustomer largely involves recommending investments based on
the customer's particular investor profile and appreciation of
"risk."7 The first step in this "process is for producers to "know"
their customers. S This entails conducting a study of their cus
tomer's financial situation, preferences, and risk tolerance. 9 "Fact
7. Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), NASD Conduct Rule 231O(a),
NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm.
8. [d.; see also N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1),2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'II 2405, at 3696
(Aug. 1994).
"
9. See Direct Participation Programs: Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule
2810(b)(2), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
Distributiori of Securities of Members & Affiliates-Conflicts of Interest: Suitability,
NASD Conduct Rule 2720(k), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available
at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
NASAA Omnibus Guidelines, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'II 2323, at 1388 (Oct. 1983);
N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), supra note 8; OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, 'II D(3), at 10 (Oct. 8,
1996), available at http://www.occ.ustreas.gov/ftp/advisory/96-8.htm; Options: Suitabil
ity, NASD Conduct Rule 2860(b)(19), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998),
available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
Policy Statement on Dishonest or Unethical Business Practices, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'II
1402, at 901 (Aug. 1997); Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7;
SIB Conduct of Business Rule § 3.01, PIA RULE BOOK 17 (May 1995) (U.K. "know
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finders" or client data sheets are common methods producers use to
acquire this information. A "fact finder" is a questionnaire used to
elicit an array of personal information about a customer.1° This in
formation may include the following:ll
your customer" rule); Special Products: Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule 2844, NASD
Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
Unethical Business Practices of Investment Advisors § 1, Statement of Policy adopted
by North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, Inc. (Apr. 5, 1985), NASAA Rep.
(CCH) 'll 2201, at 1301 (1986). See generally Unif. Commercial Code § 1-203,1 U.L.A.
109 (West Supp. 1999) (good faith performance of all contracts); id. § 2-315 (implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose); Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Re
sponsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 452
(1965) (describing the suitability standard as a "first-cousin" to the Uniform Commer
cial Code implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). For general articles
discussing the history of securities suitability rules, see Seth C. Anderson & Donald
Arthur Winslow, Defining Suitability, 81 Ky. L.J. 105 (1992); Richard A. Booth, The
Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure Risk, 54 Bus.
LAW. 1599 (1999); Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORD
HAM URB. L.J. 483 (1996); Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Eco
nomic Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805 (1985); Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW.
1557 (1999); F. Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving
Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 435 (1977); Robert N.
Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO
N.V. L. REV. 189 (1998).
10. NASD Conduct Rule 2310(a) indicates that suitability is based on "the facts,
if any, disclosed by [the] customer as to his other security holdings and as to his finan
cial situation and needs." Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7;
see also Customer Account Information, NASD Conduct Rule IM-3110(b), NASD
Manual & Notices to Members(1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
The NASD Reminds Members of Their Responsibilities Regarding the Sale of Variable
Life Insurance, NASD Notice to Members 00-44, June 16, 2000, 2000 WL 1375112 (Na
tionallFederal) [hereinafterNTM 00-44]; Standards Applicable to Communications
with the Public, NASD Conduct Rule 2210(d)(2)(B)(ii), NASD Manual & Notices to
Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-231O-3,
NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm.
11. See Recommendations to Customers. (Suitability), NASD Conduct Rule
2310(b), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
see also Fair Dealing with Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-2310-2(b)(5), NASD
Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
The NASD Reminds Members of Their Responsibility Regarding the Sale of Variable
Annuities; Notice to Members 99-35 (May 1999), 1999 WL 33176256 (NationallFederal)
[hereinafter NTM 99-35]; NTM 00-44, supra note 10; Online Suitability: Suitability
Rule and Online Communications, NASD Notice to Members 01-23, at 5 n.7 (Apr.
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• Personal information (occupation, marital status, age,12 number
of dependents, investment objectives, risk tolerance,B tax status,
investment experience, liquid net worth, other investments and
savings, and annual income 14);
• Liquid and illiquid assets (income, cash and equivalents, real and
personal property, intangibles, etc.);
• Fixed and variable liabilities (personal and business indebted
ness, financial responsibilities, etc.);
• Investments inventory (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, annuities,
etc.); and,
2001), available at http://members.nasdr.comlpdf-textl0123ntm.txt [hereinafter NTM
01-23]; Standards Applicable to Communications with the Public, supra note 10. See
generally In re Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 138 (1960) (stating that a broker-dealer must
attempt to become familiar with the customer "so as to be in a position to judge the
suitability of the recommendation").
12. Customer age is a significant factor, in addition to investment sophistication,
in assessing suitability; particularly where speculative investments or churning is in
volved. See NTM 00-44, supra note 10 (overage monitoring); In re Lewis, 50 S.E.C.
747,749 & n.11 (1991) (finding that frequent margin and options trading involving an 82
year-old wealthy widow violates suitability requirements as well as "'the fundamental
responsibility for fair dealing' implicit in the relationship between a broker and his or
her customers") (citing Fair Dealing with Customers, supra note 11). See generally
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23-303 (1999), (authorizing the insurance commissioner to
determine that certain types of disability insurance, life insurance, or annuity products
are "inherently unsuitable" for persons of certain ages and any subsequent sale to such
persons must be accompanied by a signed disclosure statement); Estate of Wheaton v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 463 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (fmding that an 80
year-old in poor health "might very well have reasonably" interpreted a producer's
statement as to suitability of an immediate annuity to be factual and not an expression
of opinion); COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NAT'L BANK EXAM'RS, § 413.1, O.c.c.
Bull. 94-13 (1994) (temp. insert):
One example of a critical suitability determination involves sales to elderly
bank customers. Many of these customers rely upon investments or savings
for retirement income and may consequently· demand high yields. They may
not, however, have the ability to absorb or recover losses. A nondeposit in
vestment person should also be aware that it is especially important to make a
careful suitability recommendation when dealing with a surviving spouse who
is not experienced in investment matters.
Id.; see also id. § 413.4 (listing the suitability questions used for compliance
monitoring).
13. Risk tolerance refers to a customer's express Willingness to assume different
levels of investment risk in exchange for possible returns. For instance, someone who
would prefer not to lose money investing generally would be considered to have a low
risk tolerance. Alternatively, someone who would be willing to take a chance of losing
an investment for the opportunity to make a lot more money would be considered to
have a high-risk tolerance.
14. NTM 99-35, supra note 11; see also Exchange Act Release No. 8,135,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 77,459, at 82,890 (Aug. 9, 1967);
N.Y.S.E. Rule 721(b), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) <JI 2721.10, at 4558 (Dec. 1995) (requir
ing members to exercise due diligence in ascertaining facts about their customers).
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• Documentation inventory (wills, trusts, etc.).
The next step in this form of suitability analysis is to assess
potential investment strategies to find products that are consistent
with the customer's general risk tolerance and investment hori
zon. 1S To develop an understanding of a customer's risk tolerance,
producers may evaluate current holdings. Such an examination will
enable the producer to probe a customer's awareness of the differ
ent types of investment risks (such as market, inflation, liquidity,
interest rate, currency, and lost opportunity risks). Producers may
also try to gauge the customer's sophistication about economic
trends affecting the relevant securities markets under consideration.
Part of this process may also entail developing a sense of whether
the customer has the mental and fiscal constitution to withstand fi
nanciallosses or market fluctuations, for even the best planned in
vestment strategy will be of no value to a customer who is incapable
of stomaching market downturns.1 6 Curiously, despite these com
mon concerns and techniques, there is no quantum of information,
or data gathering device, that all producers use to assess consumer
risk tolerances reliably and consistently.
15. The term "investment horizon" is used to refer to the relative point in time
when the customer is likely to want to recoup his investment. For example, a person
saving for a newborn's college education would have an approximately sixteen-year
investment horizon.
16. See MICHAEL J. ROSZKOWSKI, RISK-ToLERANCE IN FINANCIAL DECISIONS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 57-99 (2d ed. 1993). This propensity to un
derestimate risk could be a possible basis for misrepresentations. See generally CON
SUMEN. RESEARCH UNIT, LIMRA INT'L, INC., DIRECf RESPONSE: BUYING LIFE
INSURANCE THROUGH BANKS AND S&Ls 35 (Judith R. Kulak ed. 1999) [hereinafter
DIRECf RESPONSE] (noting that a significant number of bank customers acknowledge
that they did not really understand what policy they had purchased); Adopted SIB Rule
S3.03(2), PIA RULE BOOK, (June 1998) (stating that U.K. customers must understand
the risk inherent in recommended investments); Booth, supra note 9, at 1605 (advocat
ing that producers who cause customers to assume unnecessary risk should be liable
under well-established principles of fiduciary duty); Richard A. Booth, Stockholders,
Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty),
53 Bus. LAW. 429 (1998) (examining the extent to which management owes a fiduciary
duty to stockholders and the stockholders' right to sue for breach); Howell E. Jackson,
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77
WASH. u. L.Q. 319, 345, 349, 356-67 (1999) (explaining that while informed consent
may relieve a regulated party from some disclosure-oriented duties, disclosure strate
gies are not entirely effective in helping public investors to process information about
risk and the multi-faceted nature of insurance); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, As
sumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
851,858-72 (1992) (discussing the rationality of investor behavior); Lynn A. Stout, Are
Stock Markets Costly Casinos?, 81 VA. L. REv. 611 (1995) (suggesting a heterogeneous
expectations model for predicting investor expectations ex ante and avoiding ex post
disappointment).
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Recommendation of a particular product also varies depending
on the consumer's anticipated investment horizon and financial re
sources. For instance, consumers may be attracted to different
products depending on how long they expect to live. Similarly, a
consumer's current financial resources may dictate whether she
elects to purchase more or less insurance. Taken together, a pro
ducer might recommend that a young person, who expects to live a
long life and has little disposable income at the time of solicitation,
buy only as much insurance as is necessary for her burial. On the
other hand, a producer might recommend that a 40-year-old per
son, who has a great deal of disposable income at the time of solici
tation, buy enough insurance to sustain her family in the lifestyle to
which they have become accustomed, pay for her children's college
education, and perhaps leave some remaining proceeds for her fa
vorite charity.
The suitability analysis process culminates with a "recommen
dation." A recommendation should be supported by the producer's
development of a reasonable basis to believe that it is suitable for
that specific customer 17 "or at least some customers."18 The exact
form of communications that constitute a recommendation varies
depending upon the facts and circumstances. 19 The determination
of how or whether a "recommendation" was made is critical be
cause producers who act as mere order-takers for their customers'
unsolicited orders are exempt from the obligation to perform a suit
ability analysis. 20
17. NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at n.3 (discussing relevancy to "more traditional
communications, such as discussions in person, over the telephone, or through postal
mail").
18. Id. at n.4. While suitability should preferably be based on the instant con
sumer's preference and needs, the NASD acknowledges that a producer could defend
the suitability of a recommendation if the recommendation would be suitable for other
consumers with a similar risk profile. Id.
19. Id. at 3.
20. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,608, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,017 (Apr. 28, 1992)
(stating that a broker-dealer has not made a recommendation when it acts solely as an
order taker); NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at n.7; Clarification of Notice to Members 96
60, Mar. 1997, 1997 WL 1909772 (NationaJ/Federal) (stating that events or circum
stances constituting a recommendation "depend on an analysis of all the relevant facts
and circumstances"); see also Exchange Act Release No. 8,135 [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder], supra note 14, at 82,890 (commenting that mass mailings of research report to
all customers should not constitute a recommendation). But see Exchange Act Rule
15g-9m, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b) (1999) (penny stock suitability rules); Members Re
minded to Use Best Practices When Dealing in Speculative Securities, NASD Notice to
Members 96-32, May 9, 1996, 1996 WL 1771312 (NationaJ/Federal) [hereinafter NTM
96-32] (stating that suitability requirements do not vary as to whether the sale was solic
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The Sophisticated Securities Customer

"Sophisticated" and institutional securities investors are sub
ject to different suitability standards than the average investor de
scribed above. 21 Consistent with other securities laws, NASD
Conduct Rules arguably establish lower suitability obligations for
affluent or astute securities investors.22 Regardless of these thresh
ited or not solicited when involving low-price, speculative securities). With few excep
tions, such as term life insurance, it could be argued that most life products are "sold"
rather than "bought," thereby eliminating a producer's opportunity to avoid suitability
obligations. See DIRECf RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 29; see also Sales Practice Re
quirements for Certain Low- Priced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 27,160 [1989
Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 84,440, at 80,416 (Aug. 22, 1989) (penny
stocks).
21. Some types of investors included in this group are financial institutions, trusts
with total assets in excess of $5 million, and affluent investors. Securities Act of 1933,
17 CF.R. § 230.501(a) (1992) (defining "accredited investors" to include (a) person
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of
purchase exceeds $1 million or (b) person who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse
in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a "reasonable expectation" of
reaching the same income level in the current year); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
17 CF.R. § 275.205(a) (1992) (permitting performance based advisory contracts with
"qualified clients"); 17 CF.R. § 275.205-3(d)(I) (defining "qualified clients" to include,
among other things, (i) persons who have at least $750,000 under management with the
investment adviser; or (ii) a person or company that has a net worth, individually or
with a spouse, of more than $1.5 million at the time of contract); Investment Company
Act of 1940,15 U.S.CA. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (West 1997) (exempting non-pUblicly traded
entities comprised of "qualified purchasers" from the definition of an investment com
pany). "Qualified purchasers" generally include (i) people or companies who own not
less than $5 million in investments; (ii) trusts whose trustees consist of qualified pur
chasers; and (iii) any person, acting for his own behalf or other qualified purchasers,
who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25 million
in investments. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.CA. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)
(West 1997).
22: See Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10 (noting
that while the suitability guidelines applicable to institutional customers adopted in
1996 are "difficult to determine in advance," they continue to be "customer-specific");
see also Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (listing the plaintiff's
sophistication and expertise in financial and securities matters as a factor in assessing
the reasonableness of a plaintiffs reliance); Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981)
(stating that the manner in which a broker carries out his duties depends on the cus
tomer's intelligence and personality); cf Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir.
1991) (stating that criteria other than wealth, such as age, education, professional status,
investment experience, and business background, may be relevant in assessing sophisti
cation); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 854 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating that business sophistication of customer is irrelevant in the context of a statute
of limitations challenge). But see Hanly v. SEC., 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (hold
ing that a salesperson's due diligence obligations relative to recommended securities are
not affected by customer sophistication); NASD Issues Rule Proposal on Members'
Suitability Obligations, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 594 (Apr. 21, 1995)
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olds, a producer, who is also a registered representative?3 continues
to be expected to meet "high standards of competence, profession
alism, and good faith."24 The NASD has identified two important
considerations in determining the suitability of a recommendation
to a sophisticated customer.25 The first ·factor is the customer's abil
ity to independently evaluate investment risk. 26 NASD Conduct
Rule IM-231O-3 provides the following guidance in assessing inde
pendent risk assessment:
A member must determine, based on the information availa
ble to it, the customer's capability to evaluate investment risk. In
some cases, the member may conclude that the customer is not
capable of making independent investment decisions in general.
In other cases, the institutional customer may have general capa
bility, but may not be able to understand a particular type of in
strument or its risk .... If a customer is either generally not
capable of evaluating investment risk or lacks sufficient capabil
ity to evaluate the particular product, the scope of a member's
customer-specific obligations under the suitability rule would not
be diminished by the fact that the member was dealing with an
institutional customer. On the other hand, the fact that a cus
tomer initially needed help understanding a potential investment
need not necessarily imply that the customer did not ultimately
develop an understanding and make an independent investment
(offering guidance to members on how to determine when their obligations to institu
tional investors have been met, but cautioning that the proposed rule did not provide a
"safe harbor"). See generally Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The
Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
527, 546-65 (1998) (discussing the impact of suitability standards on institutional inves
tors in the aftermath of derivatives investments gone awry); Rapp, supra note 9, at 232
35 (examining cases involving sophisticated customers).
23. In securities sales, the term "registered representative" refers to any producer
who is associated with a broker-dealer that is a member of the NASD.
24. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10; see also Fair
Dealing with Customers, supra note 11. Even though the registered representative may
rely on customer statements in connection with its suitability analysis, Recommenda
tions to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7, the potential repercussions for an incor
rect conclusion may justify independent verification. The SEC has consistently looked
to whether customers, especially wealthy older customers who were new to investing,
fully understood and accepted investment risks. See, e.g., In re Dambro, 51 S.E.C. 513,
517 (1993) (stating that the appropriateness of a transaction is based on the particular
investor and not whether the individual can afford to lose the money invested); In re
Erdos, 47 S.E.C. 985, 989 (1983) (finding that excessive trading in the account of an
elderly widow of limited financial means violated suitability standards); In re Philips &
Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956) (stating that recommendations must be consistent with a
customer's financial situation and needs).
25. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10.
26. Id.
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decision. 27
The second "most important" factor is the customer's ability to
exercise independent judgment in evaluating the representative's
recommendations. 28 The following statement summarizes the ap
plication of these prerequisites:
A member may conclude that a customer is exercising inde
pendent judgment if the customer's investment decision will be
based on its own independent assessment of the opportunities
and risks presented by a potential investment, market factors and
other investment considerations. Where the broker-dealer has
reasonable grounds for concluding that the institutional customer
is making independent investment decisions and is capable of in
dependently evaluating investment risk, then a member's obliga
tion to determine that a recommendation is suitable for a
particular customer is fulfilled. Where a customer has delegated
decision-making authority to an agent, such as an investment ad
visor or a bank trust department, this interpretation shall be ap
plied to the agent. 29
The NASD also lists various "resources" and considerations30
for whether a customer could be making independent investment
decisions. Clearly, these factors indicate a lesser sense of paternal
ism toward these invest()rs as compared to the average customer.
B.

Product Specific Suitability Standards

The following discussion illustrates that in addition to cus
tomer-specific suitability standards, the type of suitability analysis
provided could vary based on the type of product recommended.
Suitability standards for traditional products31 differ from those ap~
plied to variable products. 32 One explanation for this difference
could be that most insurance regulators have yet to embrace any
suitability standard while self-regulatory organizations, such as the
NASD, have had enduring standards that have been publicly en
forced. 33 Another reason could be that the paternalistic approach
27. Id. (According to NASD parlance, the word "member" refers to any brokerdealer that maintains membership with the NASD.).
28. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See supra note 6 for a definition of traditional products.
32. See supra note 6 for a definition of variable products.
33. See In re Holland, 52 S.E.C. 562 (1995); In re Keel, 51 S.E.C. 282, 283 & 286
(1993) (determining that a customer's failure to complain that transactions were un au
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taken by state insurance regulations contrasts with the disclosure
orientation of securities laws. 34 The differences between ap
proaches by insurance regulators, on one hand, and securities and
banking regulators, on the other, may soon become more blurred as
a result of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley" Act35 andnumerous attempts
by entities such as the NASD and Securities and Exchange Com
mission ("SEC") to extrapolate their standards onto insurance re
lated· products. 36
thorized does not relieve a broker of the obligation to meet suitability standards); In re
Wickswat, 50 S.E.C. 785, 787 (1991) (stating that registered representatives must make
recommendations consistent with the customer's objectives and needs regardless of
whether the customer acquiesces in the particular strategy); In re F.J. Kaufman & Co.,
50 S.E.C. 164 (1989) (stating that registered representatives have a duty to recommend
and sell products that were consistent with the customer's specific investment needs and
objectives); NAT'L ASs'N OF SECS. DEAiERS, INC., NASD SANCTION GUIDELINES 91-92
(2001), available at http://www.nasdr.com/31oo.asp (recommending various penalties for
egregious violations of sales practices, including suspension or bar of the registered rep
resentative or broker, fines of up to $100,000, rescission, and restitution); Carl B. Wil
kerson, A New Regulatory Paradigm: Variable Product Distribution And Compliance,
Address to the 1998 ACLI Compliance Section Annual Meeting (July 15, 1998) (moni
toring of suitability of initial sales and sub-account investments has become an indica
tion of good internal controls and sales practices) (on file with author).
34. It may be argued that the NASD's approach to suitability allows a consumer
to make an investment decision once the producer provides all relevant information.
On the other hand, insurance regulators tend to over-protect consumers by considering
factors such as the consumer's wherewithal to appreciate the nature of the disclosures
provided. See supra Part I for a discussion of different approaches to determining
suitability.
35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
36. See Rules Relating to Over-the-Counter Markets, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5
(1999) (involving suitability of equity funding programs in which mutual fund shares are
pledged as collateral for loans used to fund insurance premiums); Application of NASD
Conduct Rules to Group Variable Contracts and Other Exempted Securities, NASD
Notice to Members No. 97-27, May 1997, 1997 WL 1909794 (NationallFederal); NASD
Regulation Reminds Members and Associated Persons .That Sales of Variable. Con
tracts Are Subject to NASD Suitability Requirements, NASD Notice to Members No.
96-86, Dec. 1996, 1996 WL 1771346 (NationallFederal) [hereinafter NTM 96-86]; NASD
Files with the SEC Proposed Rule Governing Members Operating on Bank Premises,
NASD Notice to Members No. 96-3, Jan. 1996, 1996 WL 1771293 (NationallFederal).
Variable insurance products, it is said, are "kitchen table" products, be
cause they're sold to aging baby boomers, perhaps along with other insurance
products like life, home or auto insurance, in conversations at the consumer's
kitchen table. These consumers may be first time annuity buyers who may not
have the financial background or experience to readily understand the risks of
investing. Many have never seen a down market. Couple this fact with the
complexity of the variable annuity product itself, and the fact that many con
sumers may not realize the variable annuity is an investment that can decrease
in value, and you have the potential for problems.
Lori A. Richards, Good Compliance: A Small Price to Pay for the Enormous Growth in
Variable Annuities, Address to the National Association for Variable Annuities (June
30, 1997) (transcript on file with author); see also Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. v. Cruz,
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Traditional Products

Very few states have a suitability standard applicable to tradi
tional products. For those states that do have a standard, the words
used to regulate this process range from "suitable,"37 "not unsuita
ble,"38 to "inherently unsuitable."39 More states are not likely to
adopt a suitability standard that addresses both traditional and variNo. CSA930048, 1997 WL 33101218, at *2 (Nat'l Bus. Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997)
(applying NASD rules to a flexible premium variable life insurance product). For a
discussion of various regulatory excursions, see Jackson, supra note 16, at 379-87.
37. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60k.14 subd. 4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 72A.20 subd. 34 (West Supp. 2002); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-02-02
14(2)(1998); see also LIFE INS. DISCLOSURE MODEL REG. §2(A), III NAIC Model Reg.
Servo 580-1 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs, Inc.) (Oct. 2000). But see KAN. ADMIN. REGS.
§ 40-2-14(c)(5). The sporadic adoption of a traditional insurance suitability standard
contrasts with the vast adoption of such standards for variable life insurance and states
that have adopted securities suitability requirements for prohibited unethical and dis
honest practices in their blue sky laws. See VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., at 270-32
to -33. Several states have adopted a securities suitability requirement. See ALA. AD
MIN. CODE § 830-X-3.21(1)(a), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 7436B, at 3416 (Sept. 1999);
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 36b-31-15a(a)(2) & 15c(a)(2) (1998) (advisors); FLA. AD·
MIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-600.013(I)(d), lA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 17,463A, at 13,431
(Apr. 2001); IDA. BLUE SKY REG. r. 188, lA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 21,411H, at
17,411 (Nov. 2001) (unsuitable recommendations); IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-16-22(a)(I),
2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 24,613M, at 19,475-17 (July 1999); IOWA CODE § 502.404,2
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 25,144, at 20,130 (June 2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:040(2)(5),2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 27,404, at 22,403-3 (Nov. 2000); MD. BLUE
SKY REG. R. .03(B)(I), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 30,453, at 25,429 (Mar. 2002);
MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.1O.126(c), 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 36,467, at 31,515 (Dec.
2001); NEB. DEP'T BANKING & FIN., tit. 48 r. 002.15, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en
37,412, at 32,526 (Dec. 2001) (inappropriate investments); NEV. ADMIN. CODE. ch. 90
§ 328(h), 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 36,436B, at 33,505 (Mar. 1998) (over-the
'counter securities); N.M. ADMIN. CODE. tit.12, § 11.4.5, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en
41,538, at 36,415 (May 2001); 18 N.C. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 18 r. 6.1414(b)(3), 2A Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 43,458, at 38,524 (Dec. 2000); N.D. SEC. COMM'R REG. § 73-02-09
02(3),3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 44,462, at 39,506 (May 2001); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
1301:6-3-19(A)(5), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 45,540, at 40,529-13 (Dec. 1999); OKLA.
BLUE SKY REG. § 660:1O-5-42(b)(2), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 46,472, at 41,527
(Aug. 1998); TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 117.3,3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 55,603, at 49,568
70 (Jan. 1999) (real estate programs); VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-280(A)(3), 3A Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) en 60,426, at 53,517 (July 2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE. § 460-22B-090(7),
3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 61,618H, at 54,526-27 (Apr. 2000); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ 5.06(4), 3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 64,586, at 56,547 (Jan. 2002); WYo. BLUE SKY
REG. ch. 4, § 6(c), 3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 66,425A, at 57,506 (Aug. 1997).
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 191-15.8(4) (1998); VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG.
§ 3(C), at 270-74.
39. See, e.g., UT. CODE ANN. § 31A-23-303 (2000) (stating that inherently unsuit
able sales are voidable); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(16) (1997) (stating that an unfair
or deceptive practice includes "soliciting, selling or issuing an insurance policy when the
person soliciting, selling, or issuing the policy has reason to know or should have reason
to know that it is unsuitable for the person purchasing it").
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able products as the insurance industry and its regulators have not
been eager to embrace a securities oriented suitability standard. 40
Beyond concerns of second-guessing by customers, competitors and
the plaintiffs' bar,41 it has been argued that the fundamental nature
of traditional products defies direct comparison with securities suit
ability standards. 42 In fact, the New York Insurance Department
40. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, REpORT ON SUITABILITY 2 (1998).
[I]t should be recognized that the underlying premises of a suitability require
ment are that (1) life insurance and annuity products have become increas
ingly complex financial instruments, and (2) many consumers are not
sufficiently informed to make wise purchase decisions, in that (a) they are not
aware of all the types of insurance and other products available in the market;
(b) they cannot judge the appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain
products, and (c) they do not know the true cost of such products.
[d.

A NAIC Suitability Working Group was created in 1998 to produce a white paper
as to the advisability of drafting a model law or regulation giving insurers responsibility
to determine suitability of sales of life insurance and annuities as a result of a charge
assigned to the Life Insurance and Annuities (A) Committee. NAT'L ASs'N OF INS.
COMM'RS, SUITABILITY OF SALES OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES 1 (2000), availa
ble at http://www.naic.org [hereinafter NAIC WHITE PAPER]. The charge was precipi
tated, in large part, by concerns expressed by the members of two working groups, the
Replacement Issues Working Group and the Annuities Working Group. [d. See http://
www.naic.org/1committee/suitability/suitwg.htm (overviewing various comments to
these drafts). On March 18, 2002, .the Suitability Working Group of the A Committee
released a new model regulation addressing the suitability of sales of fixed life insur
ance and annuities. At the NAIC Summer National Meeting held on June 11, 2002, the
A Committee considered but did not adopt the model. See http://www.naic.org/
1papers/models/models.html.
41. See Letter from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director, Government Affairs,
New York State Association of Life Underwriters, Inc., to Neil D. Levin, Superinten
dent State of New York Insurance Department (Nov. 24, 1998) (on file with author);
Letter from Donald J. Walters, Senior Counsel, American Council of Life Insurance, to
Carolyn J. Johnson, National Association of Insurance Commissioners 8 (Sept. 22,
1999) (on file with author) (concluding that subjectivity of a suitability standard applied
to traditional product sales would likely exacerbate existing class action litigation).
42. See N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 10 ("The determination as to suitability
for life insurance and annuity products is more subjective than in the securities industry
because competent professionals may legitimately disagree as to which products best
suit the consumer's needs."); Letter from Life Insurance Council of New York Inc., to
N.Y. Insurance Department (Sept. 28, 1998) affixed to N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40,
at attachment 3.
Even when the inquiry is expressed as "not unsuitable", a double negative that
roughly equates to "not bad for you," the life insurance industry has misgiv
ings about any standard suggesting mandatory suitability, because even within
the industry there is a great variety of viewpoint about what products or sell
ing methods are best for the consumer. The industry is concerned that every
sale could be subject to an infinity of second guessing and litigation, not be
cause of obvious movements of the market as in securities, but due to shifting
sentiment or the conflicting views that could be expressed about a given in
surer or agent or given insurance product. In the, securities field, nobody ever
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outright rejected applying the suitability paradigm employed by the
securities industry to the sale of any traditional products. 43 As a
result, approaches to suitability continue to vary greatly between
the securities and life insurance industries.
Nonetheless, many producers of traditional products have uti
lized certain aspects of variable product suitability standards, such
as the benefits of completing a fact finder 44 and conducting an in
surance inventory (life, health, disability, property, and other insur
ance policies, etc.) in order to compare products. 45
One apparent difference between variable and traditional
product suitability standards is the focus on a customer's "needs."
This difference could be attributed to the common belief that a
traditional product may be recommended only if it satisfied some
complains about the suitability of a recommendation to buy low and sell high.
In life insurance and annuity sales, suitability will be ever more difficult to
measure because of the subjective and changing circumstances of a buyer, in
sured, or beneficiary.
Id. See generally VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., II NAIC Model Reg. Servo 270-32
to -33 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Jan. 1996).
43. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 10; see'also Letter from Donald J. Walters,
Senior Counsel, American Council of Life Insurance, to Carolyn Johnson, National As
sociation of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 41 (stating that suitability standards
are inapplicable to traditional (non-variable) life insurance and annuity products based
on the absence of principal fluctuations and the presumed absence of inherent invest
ment objectives); NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 40. The proposition that existing
laws adequately address market conduct relative to suitability disregards the reality that
producers may contemporaneously solicit variable and/or traditional products. Hence,
it is ludicrous to assume that the producer would be in a position to realistically safe
guard customer best interests by going through somersaults to meet NASD suitability
demands for variable sales and then, on the other hand, stand mute as the customer
potentially catapults from a cliff of poor decision-making in connection with a fixed
dollar purchase. This hyper-reaction to universal regulation has also led many produc
ers to either ignore, or to take less seriously, the traditional insurance suitability re
quirements, especially as their insurance licenses are not necessarily jeopardized by
such blissful ignorance.
44. See VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG. § 3(C) cmts. at 270-32. This section
was derived, in part, from the NAIC Model Regulation on Deceptive Practices Section
5(g). Id. § 3(C) cmts. at 270-31; see also id. § 8(C), at 270-18; Michael W. Kessler, The
Suitability Provision of the NAIC Model Variable Life Insurance Regulation, II NAT'L
ASS'N INS. COMM'RS 544 (1974); INS. MARKETPLACE STANDARDS ASS'N ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK 42 (David A. Vaprin ed. 1997) (implementing a principle of ethical con
duct) [hereinafter IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK]; IOWA. ADMIN. CODE § 191-15.8(4)
(1999) (stating that suitability analysis for group life insurance or annuities must con
sider the interests of the intended group policy owner).
45. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60K.14 subd. 4 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring produc
ers to compare the values, benefits, and costs of the customer's existing insurance pro
gram with the values, benefits, and costs of the recommended policy or policies); N.D.
ADMIN. CODE § 45-02-02-14(2)(c) (1999).
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articulated customer "need."46 A manufacturer's underwriting pro
cess also depends on the expression of a definitive purpose for a
product purchase in order to avoid anti-selection or speculation.47
A needs analysis can be a linear analysis of a customer's finan
cial situation and aspirations. 48 The "needs" being addressed in life
insurance solicitations are usually those of the proposed benefi
ciaries as viewed through the eyes of the applicant-customer. This
type of SUbjectivity, however, leaves great room for miscalculations
and exposure flowing from misjudgments based on second-hand as
sessments. For instance, a spouse may disagree strongly with the
spouse purchasing the product about how much money is needed
46. For instance, Principle 1 of the Insurance Marketplace Standards Association
(IMSA) Principles of Ethical Market Conduct, adopted by many life insurance compa
nies, requires that insurers and their producers render services to customers that, in the
same circumstances, they would apply to or demand for themselves. 1MSA ASSESS
MENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 42. Code A of this Principle demands that produc
ers "make reasonable efforts to determine the insurable needs or financial objectives
of ... customers based upon relevant information obtained from the customer and
enter into transactions which assist the customer in meeting his or her insurable needs
or financial objectives." Id.; see also VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG. § 3( C), at 270
74; Robert M. Crowe, Meeting Client Needs Through Financial Planning, in FUNDA
MENTALS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 1-28 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing financial planning
considerations involving all aspects of a customer's financial position); Robbin Derry,
The Ethical Environment of Financial Planning, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
PLANNING 399, 406-08 (citing The American College's Professional Pledge which sup
ports "customer focused" planning or selling); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AM. SOc'Y OF
CLU & CHFC, Guide 1.1, cmts. A & C, Guide 1.4, reprinted in FUNDAMENTALS OF
FINANCIAL PLANNING 408-09 (supporting initial and ongoing needs analysis) (the or
ganization is now the Society of Fmancial Services Professionals); Thomas J. Wolff,
How Much Life Insurance Is Enough?, in MCGILL'S LIFE INSURANCE 873-84 (1994).
47. JANE L. BROWN, INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 128, 131-32 (1997); see also
Letter from Life Insurance Council of New York, to N.Y. Insurance Department (Sept.
28, 1998) affixed to N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at attachment 3 (explaining that
needs analysis in life insurance uniquely involves insurable interest considerations);
Kessler, supra note 44, at 543.
48. See KENNETH HUGGINS, ET AL., INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN INSURANCE
COMPANIES 320-21 (1995); see also Kessler, supra note 44, at 542.
In order to be "suitable," any product must reasonably purport to meet the
need for which it is purchased as perceived by the purchaser. However, as a
product or service becomes more complex, and the purchaser is encouraged
and/or compelled as a result of such complexity to rely on the representations
of a professional and experienced vendor as to how well the product meets the
purchaser'S needs, it becomes clear that the seller's conception of these needs
and the ability of his product to meet them becomes an equally significant
factor in ascertaining "suitability."
Id. A registered representative's perception of a customer's financial objectives is a
poor defense to claims of unsuitability where churning is alleged or when unqualified
customers trade speculative securities. See, e.g., In re Keel, 51 S.E.C. 282, 287 (1993)
(finding that representative bears a fiduciary duty to customers about the risks of op
tions trading); In re Lewis, 50 S.E.C. 747, 748-49 (1991).
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for his or her future sustenance. The highly personal nature of the
decisions that a customer must make in deciding among various
types and amounts of life insurance has 'led to speculation that the
producer alone bears the ultimate responsibility for inquiring
whether the customer "loves their mother or spouse more. "49
2.

Needs Hierarchy

Financial needs could be viewed in terms of a Maslow50 type
hierarchy of needs. Under this conceptual approach, the most im
portant and largest life needs such as food and shelter, medical,
property and casualty insuranc~, and emergency funds would con
stitute primary needs that must be secured before resources could
begin to be allocated to life and di~ability insurance or perhaps edu
cation, retirement and estate planning. The last "needs" to be satis
fied from remaining disposable resources could then be devoted to
speculative investments.
Under a needs-hierarchy approach, customers must identify
the relative level of resources that they are willing to commit to
each tier of "needs." Producers using this conceptual approach
might ask their customers to allocate greater resources to primary
tiers or, perhaps, to skew resources to a higher tier even though a
lower tier may be insufficiently funded. For instance, a customer
could buy a life insurance policy even though he or she has little or
no emergency funds.
49. Facsimile from Susan N. Skaling, Associate General Counsel, Life Insurance
Council of New York, to Section 4228 Coordinating Committee (Aug. 25, 1998) (on file
with author).
50. The behaviorist Abraham Maslow developed a theory of human motivation
that used a pyramid to designate the hierarchy between physiological needs, safety, love
and acceptance, esteem and self-fulfillment. A. a Maslow, A Theory of Human Moti
vation, 50 PSYCHOL. REv. 370-96 (July 1943), cited in ROBERT KREITNER, MANAGE·
MENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 399-402 (1995); see also DEARBORN FIN. INST., INC.,
SERIES 7, GENERAL SECURITIES REPRESENTATIVE LICENSE EXAM MANUAL 469 fig.
15.1 (10th ed. 1998). The investment pyramid is based on safety oriented instruments
such as cash, money-market funds, certificates of deposit, U.S. Treasury securities,
bank-grade corporate and municipal bonds, some real estate blue chip stocks, blue chip
stock, and bond mutual funds. The next, smaller tier is dedicated to growth instruments
such as growth and small-capitalization stocks, stock options, non-pank-grade bonds,
growth-oriented limited partnerships, growth stock mutual funds, commodities funds
and variable annuities. The top tier of investments is speculative in nature and includes
speculative stocks and stock options, low-rated debt securities, precious metals, com
modities and futures, speculative limited partnerships, and speculative mutual funds.
Id.
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Expense Analysis

A person's need for insurance could also be broadly conceptu
alized in terms of the following formula:
I = (F + E + A + R) - II
where, I = insurance needed
F = funds to be established, such as education and emergency funds
E = expenses payable, such as estate settlement, mortgage redemp
tion, estate taxes, medical bills and funeral costs
A = ancillary expenses, such as charitable contributions
R = family revenue needed to replace the ordinary and anticipated
living expenses formerly paid by the deceased person
II = face amount of in-force insurance
As with any linear model, this analysis may be criticized as be
ing very static and unrealistic if any assumption conflicts with actual
results. In other words, the computation does not consider infla
tion, technological advances, or lifestyle adjustinents, among other
unforeseeable circumstances.
4.

Capital Needs Analysis

Capital needs analysis is another variation of expense analysis.
Simply stated, this process may be conceptually described by the
following formula:
I = (N + PVFFO ) - (A + M)
where, I = insurance needed
N = all identified capital needs (e.g., debt elimination, education
and/or retirement funding, income sources, etc.)
PVFFO = present value of future financial obligations based on pre
sumed interest, inflation, and tax factors
A = available assets
M = available income
In addition to being considered static, this method assumes
that all available assets and income will be depleted to satisfy iden
tified needs. Assumptions regarding inflation and future tax struc
tures create the potential for gross deviations from actual future
needs. The downward spiral of depleting resources also affects pos
sible assumptions regarding future investment income as well as re
sulting in a possibly barren estate for contingent beneficiaries.
5.

Human Life Value Method

One academic expression of the need for life insurance is to
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replace the "human life value" of the insured. 51 This method is typ
ically used in wrongful death litigation and seeks to measure a fam
ily's potential loss based on factors such as the income earning
potential of the insured over the insured's remaining employable
years. This method includes consideration of factors frequently as
sociated with disability insurance, such as the insured's age, occupa
tion, and potential for increased or sustained earned income. 52
6.

Financial Factors Methods

Life insurance underwriters may consider economic life value,
affordability, and existing insurance when determining the maxi
mum insurance available. 53 The economic life value factors consid
ered include the apparent relationship of the insured's current
income to the projected needs of the beneficiaries. 54 For example,
a 36-year-old insured making $45,000 per year and providing the
sole financial support to three young children could support insur
ance coverage of $500,000 to $750,000 but not $10 million.55
Life insurance underwriters may also judge the afford ability of
coverage based on either the percentage of income rule (i.e., the
20% rule) or factor tables. 56 Insurers may use subjective percent
age(s) of income as the basis to set the maximum amount that an
applicant can afford to pay for coverage. Under the 20% rule, a
maximum of 20% of the applicant's gross earned income can be
used to pay modal life insurance premiums. Insurers may also use a
periodically updated factor table showing the maximum amount of
insurance available based on multiples of the applicant's· salary or
total income and categorized by age. 57 For instance, an insurer
could use a factor table to conclude that a 25-year-old with a cur
rent annual income of $30,000 should not obtain more than
$480,000 (eighteen times average income) in life insurance (absent
other factors indicating that the applicant's expected future income
potential would support a higher amount of insurance).58 A pro
posed insured may have currently in force an excessive amount of
51. See John E. Scarborough, The Balance of Life, 94 LIFE ASS'N NEWS 68 (Jan.
1999) (discussing difference between methods); see also Virginia Simon, Human Life
Value vs. Needs Based Selling, LIFE & HEALlH ADVISOR (N. Eng), May 1999, at 4.
52. See Scarborough, supra note 51.
.
53. BROWN, supra note 47, at 132-34; see also Kessler, supra note 44, at 544-45.
54. BROWN, supra note 47, at 132-34.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 134-36.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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insurance relative to his or her economic value. 59 Insurers may in
clude accidental death benefit coverage, personal insurance, and
business insurance into these considerations. 60
7.

Business Financial Factors Methods

Business insurance needs feature many of the same factors
considered for personal insurance. Financial assessment for busi
ness insurance focuses on the financial condition of the business, its
capacity to pay premiums, and the anticipated loss suffered by the
death of the proposed insured. 61
C.

Variable Products

In addition to the general fairness standards,62 the NASD Con
duct Rules and interpretations thereof establish the following ex
tensive requirements for variable product suitability.63
1.

Variable Annuities

The suitability analysis associated with the sale of variable an
nuities has captured the attention of commentators,64 regulators,
and the plaintiffs' bar. 65 The NASD approach to variable annuity
suitability expands otherwise applicable suitability analyses by
"suggesting" that registered representatives consider the following
best practices:
• Make reasonable efforts to obtain comprehensive, complete, and
accurate customer information, "including the customer's occu
pation, marital status, age, number of dependents, investment
objectives, risk tolerance, tax status, previous investment experi
59.
60.

[d.
[d. at 136.

61. See id. at ch. 7.
62. Fair Dealing with Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-2310-2, NASD Man
ual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comiwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?net=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm.
63. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the NASD non-"sophisticated" securi
ties investor suitability rule. See generally Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule
2860(b)(19), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comiwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?net=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm.
(defining suitability standards for option contracts); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b) (2001)
(establishing requirements for low-priced securities).
64. See, e.g., David Snyder, Enforcement Spotlight: Variable Products, LIMRA's
MARKETFAcrs, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 10.
65. See, e.g., Soranno v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 96 C 7882, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis
14073, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (discussing misrepresentations/omissions regard
ing interest rates).

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

66

[Vol. 24:47

ence, liquid net worth, other investments and savings, and annual
income."66
• "[R]eview the customer's investment objectives, risk tolerance,
and other information to determine that the variable annuity
. contract as a whole and the underlying sub accounts recom
mended to the customer are suitable. "67
• "[C]ompare the information in the account application with other
relevant information sources, e.g., an account information form,
to check for apparent accuracy and consistency."68
• Determine the duration of the customer's objectives inasmuch as
short-term objectives may lead to surrender charges or penalties
for early withdrawal under the Internal Revenue Code. 69 .
• "[C]onduct an especially comprehensive suitability analysis prior
to approving the sale of a variable annuity with surrender charges
to a customer in a tax-qualified account subject to plan minimum
distribution requirements."7o
2.

Variable Life Insurance

In addition to the general securities suitability standards men
tioned above, the NASD has provided the following non-exclusive
factors that could be considered by producers in assessing suitabil
ity requirements pertaining to variable life products:
• A representation by the customer as to whether his or her life
insurance;71
insurance needs have been met through existing
• An express desire to buy an investment as compared to an insur
ance product;72
• A customer's understanding about how the premiums are allo
cated among product costs and expenses and the complexity of
variable insurance products generally;73
• Affordability of premiums and the source of premium funding
(i.e., policy financing);74·

life

66. NTM 99-35, supra note 11, 'II 1.
67. Id. 'II 4. See generally Booth, supra note 9, at 1605-09 (diversification).
68. See NTM 99-35, supra note 11, 'II 4.
69. See id. 'II 8.
70. See id. 'II 12; see also United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Va
riable Annuities: What You Should Know, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
varannty.htm (last modified Apr. 5, 2001).
71. NTM 96-86, supra note 36.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. NTM 00-44, supra note 10. Policy financing involves the payment of premi
ums through the use of loans of cash values from an existing policy for so long as the
original policy can sustain such withdrawals.
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• When the proceeds will be needed;7s
• . Whether the product was sold for retirement needs;76
• Customer investment sophistication and capability to monitor
performance. 77
In contrast to the apparent reluctance to embrace a universal stan
dard applicable to traditional products, state insurance laws do af
firm the benefits of a clear suitability standard applicable to
variable life products.7l:! In June 1974, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") adopted a definition of "suita
bility" in the context of model variable life insurance regulation. 79
This definition was based on securities laws and a need to harmo
nize such laws. with insurance regulations. so The following priorities
were suggested for conducting this analysis:
"Suitability" means the likelihood that the purchase of variable
life insurance is reasonably consistent with: (1) the expressed in
surance objectives and needs as perceived by the prospective in
sured; (2) the reasonable objectives and needs of the prospective
insured as determined objectively by a professional agent after a
diligent reasonable inquiry into relevant financial, family and
other background information concerning the prospective in
sured; and (3) the potential that the prospective insured will per
sist with the policy for such a period of time that the insurer's
75. NTM 96-86, supra note 36.
76. [d.
77. See id.
78. All insurers seeking to sell variable life insurance policies in a state that has
adopted the NAIC Variable Life Insurance Model Regulation must also establish and
maintain a written statement specifying its suitability standards. VARIABLE LIFE INS.
MODEL REG. § 3(C), II NAIC Model Reg. Serv., 270-74 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs,
Inc.) (Jan. 1996). As of October, 1999, thirty-eight states have adopted either the model
act or ,a related version of the same. [d. at 270-69 to -72. See generally Dist. Bus.
Conduct Comm. for Dist. No.8 v. Cruz, No. C8A930048, 1997 WL 33101218 (Nat' I Bus.
Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997) (finding that suitability analysis must be performed to
the product as a whole, not just the securities aspects of the product, and a registered
representative has a responsibility to perform an independent suitability assessment).
79. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., at 270-32 to -33. Standards of Suitability
adopted by the Board of Directors and filed with the Commissioner had to include a
suitability requirement. Kessler, supra note 44, at 541.
80. NAIC counsel summarized this initiative as follows:
While the actual language ... is based on SEC Rule 15b 10-3, the concept of
suitability is not foreign to insurance. In fact, those who saw the earlier drafts
of the model regulation will recall that the suitability provisions were more
extensive than at present. They were modified at the suggestion of several
SEC staff members and insurance industry representatives who expressed con
cern ensuing from a potential conflict between the NAIC and SEC
requirements.
Kessler, supra note 44, at 542 (footnote omitted).

68

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:47

acquisition costs are amortized over a reasonable period of
time .... When variable life insurance meets characteristics (1)
and (3) or (2) and (3), it is probably still "suitable" in most in
stances .... Variable life insurance is clearly "unsuitable" when
it meets none of the three characteristics for a given prospect ....
Variable life insurance is probably "unsuitable" in the absence of
extraordinary factors when it does not meet characteristic
(3) . . . . Other situations must be judged on their individual
facts.81
.

In adopting the 1983 amendments to the Variable Life Insur
ance Model Regulation, the NAIC recognized that the resulting
proliferation of variable life insurance product designs might make
suitability, and particularly factors (1) and (2), even more imp or
tant. 82 On the other hand, the NAIC understood that the possibil
ity of more variable life insurance products designed to compete
with investment-oriented products of other financial institutions
would make persistency, as articulated in factor (3), less significant
because policyholders would be more likely to move among com
peting financial institution products for reasons such as rate of re
turn, tax considerations, and economic conditions. 83 As a result,
the NAIC made persistency less relevant as a measure of
suitability.84
The decision to recoil from persistency85 is a noteworthy re
treat from very strong sentiments about its overall relevance to suit
ability analysis and the public image of the industry.86 The pre-1983
version of the Model Act acknowledged that suitability was a diffi
cult area to police and that an objective criterion, such as lapse
rates, would be an accurate yardstick. 87 Nine years later, however,
these factors were considered to be irrelevant in traditional prod
ucts88 and to suitability.89 A newer view blamed lapse rates on poli
cyholders and non-producer related circumstances. 9o In doing so,
81. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33.
82. Id.
83. See id. at cmt.
84. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 542.
85. See id. at 543.
86. Id.
87. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33; see also Kessler, supra
note 44, at 541 ("The inclusion of a suitability provision was in partial response to a
concern of the NAIC that variable life insurance might be missold and/or oversold, with
the resultant possibility that early lapses might be numerous.").
88. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33.
89. Id. at 270-34.
90. See id.
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this view disregarded the previous subcommittee's call "for insur
ance regulators to require and instill in insurers the commitment to
underwrite for suitability (including persistency) ... for the benefit
of themselves, their agents, the policyholders, and the public."91

D.

Transaction Specific Suitability Standards

Various regulatory bodies have adopted regulations and issued
warnings92 to deter twisting and indiscriminate replacements93 of
one insurance product for another. These admonitions have also
been applied to replacing bonus annuities on the presence of a "bo
nus credit" (i.e., features that offer the investor an immediate credit
equal to a percentage of purchase payments that may otherwise off
set applicable contingent deferred sales charges pertaining to the
early surrender of an existing annuity).94
According to the New York legislature, replacements are a
"special circumstance in which insurance consumers need addi
tional protections to avoid adverse consequences."95 New York's
"minimum standards of conduct" for transactions considered
"replacements" require producers to make available "full and clear
information in which an applicant can make an informed decision in
his or her own best interest."96 The "full and clear information"
needed for the customer to make an "informed decision" repre
sents a disclosure-oriented approach that shifts responsibility to the
customer through the provision of prescribed disclosures, provided
that the producer and manufacturer can demonstrate that a needs
Kessler, supra note 44, at 546.
92. See, e.g., Paul Roye, Director, Division of Investment of Management, U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission, Understanding the Securities Products of Insur
ance Companies, Keynote address before the Practicing Law Institute (Jan. 9, 2001)
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspch455.htm; State of N.Y., Insurance De
partment, Circular Letter No. 21 (June 21, 2000), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
clOO_21.htm.
93. For a generally accepted definition of the term "replacements," see N.Y.
COMPo CODES R. & REGs., tit. 11, § 51.2(a) (1998).
94. See Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7.
95. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 9.
96. N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS., tit. 11, § 51.1(b) (1998); see also LIFE INS. &
ANNUITIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG. § 1(A)(2)(a), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 613
1 (July 2000); NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302 (detailing best interest test applied to
replacement of variable life products). See generally 1MSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 44, at 62, 67; James M. Carson & Mark D. Forster, Suitability and Life Insur
ance Policy Replacement: An Analytical Tool, 18 J. INS. REG. 427447, July 1, 2000, 2000
WL 21046589 (providing critical analysis of Life Insurance and Annuities Replacement
Model Regulation).
91.
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analysis occurred.97 Worksheets98 and other materials have there
fore been developed to better document the basis for recommenda
tions described in such state mandated disclosure forms.99
The NASD's approach to variable product replacements also
generally follows this quasi-disclosure approach. NASD Notice to
Members 99-35 expands disclosure duties by obligating registered
representatives, broker-dealers1oo and wholesalers 101 to ensure the
suitability of a variable annuity replacement 102 by considering
whether such matters as product enhancements and improvements,
lower cost structures, and surrender charges justify a replacement
of an existing annuity.1 03 For instance, a producer replacing one
annuity with another based on the performance of the former must
97. See LIFE INS. & ANNUITIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG., § 1(A)(2)(b) & app.
A, at 613-11; NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302 (describing replacement forms).
98. See generally NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302; Books and Records, NASD
Conduct Rule 3110, NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998) available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm
(requiring brokers to maintain customer account information regarding the nature of
the customer and their authority); Diligence as to Accounts, N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'lI 2405, at 3696 (Aug. 1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240:15c2
5(a)(2)(1999)(equity funding programs); 17 C.F.R. § 24D.15g-9(b)(3) (penny stocks);
Anderson & Winslow, supra note 9, at 120 (stating that customers should receive writ
ten confirmation of their expressed investment objectives).
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Regulation 60, 11 N.Y.C.R.R. App. lOA & lOB (1998) (con
taining in its disclosure forms questions that must be completed by all producers effect
ing a "replacement": (1) What are the primary reason(s) for this recommendation; (2)
Why can't the existing product meet the customer's objective; (3) What are the advan
tages of continuing the existing products without changes); see also LIFE INS. & ANNUl·
TIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG., apps. A-C, at 613-12 to -15.
100. See NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv. 16 (stating that a retail member
should adopt other measures reasonably designed to ensure that replacement sales ac
tivity by its registered representatives complies with NASD rules).
101. See id.
Members that "wholesale" variable annuities are reminded that they are also
subject to NASD rules, and that they should avoid marketing strategies that
are designed primarily to encourage inappropriate replacement sales. Upon
reasonable request and to the extent practical, wholesale members should as
sist retail broker/dealers in monitoring the replacement activity of their
customers.
Id. The foregoing leaves open the question of whether the wholesaler must refuse to
cooperate with a manufacturer who developed a marketing strategy that could run
afoul of this prohibition.
102. Exchange Act Rule 15g-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.15g-9(b) (1999); Investor Tips,
Variable Annuities: What You Should Know"
at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm; NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv.
14; see also NASD Regulation Investor Alert, Should You Exchange Your Variable
Annuity?, at http://www.nasdr.com:80/alerc02-01.htm.
103. NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv. 14.
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be prepared to defend his or her sale 104 on the basis that, among
other things, the former annuity had been substantially under-per
forming relative to its peers for a substantial time period.
II.

SUITABILITY BASED LIABILITY

Suitability claims account for the vast majority of the filings
under NASD members' errors and omissions policies.1 05 One com
mentator noted that suitability has evolved into a duty without a
standard.1 06 This duty has been described as one of care,107 to
warn ,108 monitor ,109 protect,110 improve ,111 and even prevent "eco
nomic suicide."112 Recommendations carry an "implicit warranty
of soundness"113 or something in the nature of a "warranty of fit
ness for a particular purpose."114 Proof 'of meeting the quest for
equifinite results satisfying this ethical mandate 115 is measured ex
post facto, at the urging of a hapless customer116 by arbitrators.1 17
Moreover, these arbitrators consider the ex ante expectations of the
See NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at nA.
Zarb Urges Broker-Dealers to 'Be on Guard' About Suitability, 30 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 810 (May 29, 1998); see also Press Release, NASD Regula
104.
105.

tion, Inc., NASD Regulation Files Six Enforcement Actions Involving Marketing and
Sales of Variable Annuities (Feb. 15,2001) (on file with author).
106. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 191-92.
107. Id. at 190-91.
108. Id. at 212-27.
109.
110.

Id.
See Kerr, supra note 9, at 806-07 (discussing the duty to invest prudently, not

speculate, diversify, and seek productive portfolios in guidelines).
111. See id. at 806 (asserting increased productivity as one of many vague
guidelines).
112. Rapp, supra note 9, at 212-27 (stating that economic suicide could be de
scribed as making fool-hearty investments leading to financial ruin).
113. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
114. Mundheim, supra note 9, at 452.
115. The Securities and Exchange Commission has interpreted NASD suitability
standards as being an ethical yardstick for measuring producer conduct. See In re
Burkes, 51 S.E.c. 356, 360 (1993); Mundheim, supra note 9, at 464-67 (noting that the
concept of suitability originated, and was intended to remain, as an ethical principle).
116. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 191-92, 212 n.94.
117. Suitability claims are more likely to be addressed through arbitration follow
ing the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See ShearsonfAm. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriquez de Quijas v. ShearsonfAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989). See generally Rapp, supra note 9, at 192 n.9 (stating that arbitration panels now
decide most suitability claims). Courts and juries have been criticized as being poor
arbiters of suitability based on their proclivity to craft unintended remedies through the
application of equitable principles such as the rule of contra profentum, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and common law detrimental reliance. This is
an unfortunate result as "[c]ourts are institutionally ill-suited" to make these types of
decisions based on their ex post litigation perspective. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. An
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producer, and not the customer,11s on a case-by-case, investment
by-investment basis,119 unrestrained by precedent or consistency.12o
A variety of theories or initiatives have been proffered in sup
port of holding producers liable for the outcomes of their recom
mendations. It is too early to tell how functional regulatory powers
vested under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,121 and the overall con
straints now placed on state legislatures in adopting or amending
suitability guidelines,122 will expand· or curtail these bases for
exposure.
A.

The Shingle Theory
But what about this man who sells insurance? Surely his persis
tency is part of American Folklore, whether it is his foot, which is
in the door, his calendar in the mail, or his voice in the telephone
receiver. Professional man or salesman? Which is he? A man on
his own or someone else's man? A huckster in the marketplace
or an expert on whom you can rely?123

Producers have been held accountable for unsuitable sales and
overall breach of fairness standards under a so-called "shingle the
ory. "124 By "hanging out" his or her shingle, and holding himself or
derson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637,1679
(1992).
118. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 213.
119. See id. at 191 n.5, 241 (considering suitability based on overall portfolio).
120. See id. at 216-17, 263 n.315, 264-78 (discussing the shortcomings of the ex
isting regulations and proposed remedies).
121. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 301, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (pro
viding that insurance activities of any persons shall be "functionally" regulated by the
States subject to section 104 of the Act); id. tit. III, subtitle A (permitting national
banks to engage in certain additional insurance activities); id. § 305 (amending the Fed
eral Deposit Insurance Act by requiring that Federal banking agencies publish cus
tomer protection regulations applicable to retail sales practices and solicitations by
November 12, 2000, including "Customer Protection Disclosures" that will alert con
sumers to investment risks associated with variable products).
122. Suitability is not among the thirteen general safe harbors with respect to
state laws that may not be pre-empted. See id. § 104(d)(2)(B). Those statutes existing
prior to September 3, 1998, will continue to benefit from the reverse preemption appli
cation of the McCarran-Furgeson Act. See id. § 104(d)(2)(C)(i). All other attempts to
enact state laws in regard to bank sold insurance products will be affected by the legal
standards for preemption set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517
U.S. 25, 28-37 (1996).
123. Thomas J. Ziomek & Jane O. McCahill, Legal Liability of Agents and Bro
kers, J. FIN. SERVo PROFS. 64, 66 (Jan. 1999) (quoting Bartram Hartnett, RESPONSIBILI
TIES OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS § 1.01 (1997».
124. Phillip E. Stano & Carl B. Wilkerson, A Discussion of Insurers' Vicarious
Liability for Agents' Wrongdoing, 6 NAT'L. INS. L. REV. 809, 845-47 (1993). See gener
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herself out as someone who is knowledgeable about financial prod
ucts, the producer implies that he Or she will deal fairly with cus
tomers according to the standards and practices of the
professionps Accordingly, a producer's business card and direc
tory listing can be a basis for customers to expect that the producer
would not recommend products with no reasonable basis to support
such a recommendation. 126
In addition to producer exposure under this theory, one can
argue that in certain instances, manufacturers could be held respon
sible for their producers. For example, an advertisement used to
promote producers as "financial advisers" could support a claim
against the manufacturer when the producers do not have the req
uisite credentials supporting this designation. 127 General agency
law,128 concepts of respondeat superior,129 and the implied coveally Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963); Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702
(9th Cir. 1961); In re Tallman, Exchange Act Release No. 8830, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 77,800, at 83,848 (Mar. 2, 1970); In re Whitman &
Stirling Co., 43 S.E.C. 181, 182-83 (1966); Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1A
1406,56 S.E.c. Docket (CCH) 724, 725 n.6 (Mar. 16; 1994) (applying shingle theory to
investment advisers); REpORT OF COMM'R LAURA S. UNGER TO THE U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, H.R. Doc. No. 95, at 238 (1st Sess. 1963) (A 1963 Securities and Ex
change Commission Special Study of the Securities Markets specifically identified suita
bility as a distinct doctrine giving rise to both a legal obligation under antifraud
provisions and an ethical duty under SRO rules). One commentator has noted that use
of designations such as "fmancial adviser" or "financial consultant" is tantamount to
invitations for suitability claims under the shingle theory. See Rapp, supra note 9, at
190 n.3, 196-202, 263. These claims become especially colorable when producers act as
"financial interior decorators" by performing simplistic matching of generic client types
with generic types of investments. Id. at 221-22, 237-38; see also RULES GOVERNING
THE ADVERTISING OF LIFE INSURANCE § 5(N), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 570-5 (Nat'I
Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Apr. 1995). For a discussion of the shingle theory in the context
of a negligence and fraud claim, see Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 402-05 (Ariz. 1984).
125.. Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846; see Charles Hughes & Co. v.
SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943); Burke A. Christensen, Agents and Brokers, in
MCGILL'S LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 246-47 (Edward E. Graves & Burke A.
Christensen eds., 1996); Eileen B. Eglin & Richard J. Rogers, Agents' and Brokers'
Liability; Understanding Their Integral Role, in INSURANCE LAW-WHAT EVERY LAW
YER AND BUSINESSPERSON NEEDS TO KNow 111, 116.(1997); 8 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2D § 52.2(B), at 420-23 (1998).
126. See Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846.
127. See generally ADVERTISEMENTS OF LIFE INS. & ANNumES MODEL REG.
§ 5(N), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 570-5 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (July 2000).
128. See Christensen, supra note 125, at 232; Dan M. McGill, Waiver, Estoppel,
and Election by the Insurer, in MCGILL'S LIFE INSURANCE 803 (Edward E. Graves ed.,
1994).
129. See generally Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13-15; Christen
sen, supra note 125, at 244-47; Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124 (discussing vicarious
liability under respondeat superior doctrine).
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nant of good faith and fair dealing130 also provide potential bases
for claims against manufacturers.13 1
B.

Fraud Theories

The Ninth Circuit, in Anderson v. Knox, first endorsed the en
forcement of suitability requirements as a fraud concept in the con
text of an insurance policy.132 In that case, a producer who had
induced a customer to purchase excessive amounts of bank-fi
nanced insurance was liable for damages because the policies were
unsuitable to the plaintiff's needs.133 Common law fraud theories,
as compared to the anti-fraud provisions of Rule lOb-5 of the Se
curities Exchange Act,134 may also find favor with customers based
on their appeal to arbitrators 135 and the relative ease with which
130. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.2(a)(2) at
624-26 (Practitioner's ed. 1988); Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846; see also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'll 22,725, at 16,610 (Apr. 16, 1997). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applied to insurance contracts does not merely "connote the absence ... of positive
misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature," it demands that the insurer act reasona
bly to fulfill the justified expectations of the other party. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21
Cal. 3d 910, 922 n.5, 925 (1978). See generally U.C.c. § 1-203 (West Supp. 1999) (re
quiring good faith performance of all contracts); 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 198:14
(Dec. 1999) (comparing good faith and fiduciary duties).
131. See Part II.D.
132. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL
REG. § 4(D) cmts., II NAIC Model Reg. Serv., 270-34 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Jan.
1996) ("[T]he commissioner as a practical matter probably possesses ~he power to re
scind a sale based on a material misrepresentation. Common law fraud causes of action,
as well as implied rights of action, also may exist depending on the law of each individ
ual state."). But see Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011,
1016 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that justifiable reliance was needed to substantiate a com
mon law fraud claim).
133. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d702, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1961).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§ 10(b) & 15(c), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j(b) & 780(c)(I) (West Supp. 1999); Rule 15c1-2, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1999). The elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim are: "(a) a false repre
sentation of (b) a material (c) fact; (d) defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of
its falsity and their intention that plaintiff rely on it; (e) plaintiff's reasonable reliance
thereon; and (f) plaintiff's resulting loss." Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 649 (3d
Cir. 1991); see also Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 E2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993);
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992); Clark v. John
Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that a violation of
NASD suitability rule may not be a per se violation of Rule 10b-5); Booth, supra note 9,
at 1602-05; Langevoort, supra note 16, at 889-903; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note
9, at 1585-89.
135. Prior to its rescission in 1983, salespeople who were not members of a self
regulatory authority were bound by the suitability provisions of Rule 15blO-3 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Exchange Act Release No. 20,409 (Nov. 22, 1983),
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 'll 83,457 (Dec. 7, 1983); see 15
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they can be pleaded.136 Nevertheless, courts borrow heavily from
securities laws when analyzing fraud claims. 137 The factors consid
ered in framing a fraud claim therefore include misrepresentation!
omission,138 reliance,139 and possibly scienter.1 4o
U.S.c.A.. § 78o-3v (West Supp. 1999). Presently, the principal forum for addressing
private actions for damages based on suitability has shifted to the arbitration tribunals
of the NASD and other self-regulatory organizations and tribunals. See Booth, supra
note 9, at 1600 n.6, 1604; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1584, 1593-97; Rapp,
supra note 9, at 192 n.9.
136. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (stating that fraud must be stated with particularity
whereas intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind of a person may be
averred generally); see also In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.,
975 F. Supp. 584, 596-98, 613-15 (D.N.J. 1996); Berent v. Kemper Corp., 780 F. Supp.
431,440-41 (E.D. Mich. 1991) affd, 973 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1992). See generally Brown
v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Analytically, an unsuit
ability claim is a subset of the ordinary § lO(b) fraud claim in which a plaintiff must
allege, inter alia, (1) material misstatements or omissions, (2) indicating an intent to
deceive or defraud, (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."); Farlow
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sears v.
Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990» (ruling that pleadings must state "what misrepre
sentations were made by the defendant, to whom these misrepresentations were made,
when these misrepresentations were made, or how these misrepresentations furthered
the alleged fraudulent scheme"); Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir.
1969) (finding that life insurance policies are not securities under the Securities Act
thereby eliminating a cause of action under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act); Assocs. in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.c. v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
729 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1991) (to like effect);
Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 611 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 814 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing anti-fraud claims dismissed be
cause subject annuities came within Securities Act exemption).
137. See In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp.
584, 613 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Booth, supra note 9, at 1603 n.20; Lowenfels & Brom
berg, supra note 9, at 1589-91; Letter from Donald J. Walters, Senior Counsel, Ameri
can Council of Life Insurance, to Carolyn Johnson, supra note 43, at 6 (stating that Rule
10b-5 fraud analysis is inapposite to suitability analysis).
Customers may find that class action suitability claims must be framed in terms of
Rule lOb-5 claims in order to avoid federal civil procedure impediments imposed under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.c.A. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-4
(West 1994 & Supp. 2001). See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding alleged misrepresentation of the tax benefits of variable
annuities when purchased through tax-qualified investment plans and failure to disclose
fees).
138. See In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp.
at 613-14.
139. Id. at 613-15; see also Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186, 193-95 (App.
Div.1980).
140. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978);
see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.c.A. § 78j-l (West Supp.
1999) (requiring that private litigants suing under Rule lOb-5 must plead scienter with
particularity and without the benefit of discovery); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note
9, at 1588-89; In re Olde Disc. Corp., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 40423, 1998
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Fiduciary Liability

In addition to the shingle and fraud theories, producers may be
held liable as fiduciaries. Producers have been measured under
standards as someone with a higher than ordinary sense of care,141
similar to priests,142 common law fiduciaries,143 professionals,144 ex
WL575171, at *21 (1998) (holding that broker's management environment encouraged
unsuitable sales).
'
141. See HOLMES, supra note 125, at 420-23. See generally SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (stating that an investment adviser is a
fiduciary and has an affirmative duty of "good faith" and "full and fair disclosure of all
material facts" to each client); Kessler, supra note 44, at 54l.
142. See Myles A. Tracy, Insurance and Theology, 33 J. RISK & INS. 85, 91 (1966);
Alexander Welsh, The Agent As Priest, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1574, 1576 (1963).
Associations between insurance solicitation and religious organizations and concepts
can be traced back to the formation of the first U.S. life insurance company in 1759 by
the Presbyterian Synod of Philadelphia and the use of collective trusts by religious
guilds. J. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE 34, 44 (1942). Episcopalians
established their own company in 1769. Michael D. White, True Believers, NAT'L UN
DERWRITER, Sept. 13, 1993, at 19 (Life & HealthlFinancial Services ed.). In the nine
teenth century, American Revivalists objected to the sale of life insurance on
"religious" grounds on the basis that, among other things, it tempted divine Providence.
See JOHN GUDMUNDSEN, THE GREAT PROVIDER 44 (1959); STALSON, supra at 67, 150;
VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS & MARKETS 73-79 (1983). Several marketing
approaches were developed to overcome this obstacle. First, the concept of Providence
was reinterpreted as an active responsibility to use human foresight to safeguard the
future. See generally SOLOMON S. HEUBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 23 (4th ed. 1950). Sec
ond, the insurance companies developed marketing ~erminology that resonated in relig
ious imagery. See Carole King, Religion of Life Insurance Needs Revival in New Form,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 7 (Life & HealthlFinancial Services ed.), availa
ble at 1995 WL 11948458; ZELIZER, supra at 122-39.
143. See also HOLMES, supra note 125; Booth, supra note 9, at 1602-05; Lowenfels
& Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1591-92. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 1, 13, 387, 393-94, 399-401, 407, 425 (1958). For blue sky laws specifically
identifying investment advisors as fiduciaries, see IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 710, r. 1-16
22(a), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 24,613M, at 19,475-17 (Jul. 1999); MD. BLUE SKY
REG. r. 03(B), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 30,453, at 25,4279-80 (Mar. 2002); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 18-15-2 to -4,02 (2000) (banks and trustees). See generally Christensen, supra
note 125, at 244-47. For cases and articles that consider whether a producer is a fiduci
ary, see Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), affd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that discretionary account se
curities brokers become fiduciaries); In re First Secs. Corp., 40 S.E.c. 589, 590 (1961)
(finding that excessive trading (churning) is a breach of a registered representative's
"position of trust" under a duty to act in the customer's best interests); Beardmore v.
Abbott, 218 So.2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (producer fiduciary); Kanter v.
Deitelbaum, 648 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ill. App. 1995) ("The relationship between an in
sured and his [health insurance] broker, acting as the insured's agent, is a fiduciary one,
despite the fact that the broker may be compensated by a third party."); Coping with
the Crash: A Step-by-Step Guide to Investor Rights, NASAA Reports (CCH) <JI12,121, at
12,127 (1987) (analogy to trustee); Burke A. Christensen, Insurance Agent or Broker
Liability to the Insured, 10 J. INS. REG. 313-41 (Spr. 1992); Eileen B. Eglin & Richard J.
Rogers, Agents' and Brokers' Liability: Understanding Their Integral Role, in INSUR.
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perts,145 fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Secur
ity Act of 1974 (ERISA),146 or trustees. 147 The ratcheting fidelity
thresholds associated with each of these labels present special conANCE LAW-WHAT EVERY LAWYER AND BUSINESSPERSON NEEDS TO KNOW 111, 115-18
(1997); Ziomek & McCahill, supra note 123, at 64, 66. But see In re The Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584, 616-18 (D. N.J. 1996) (dismissing
claims that producers or insurer owed a fiduciary duty to insureds); Anderson & Wins
low, supra note 9, at 107 n.15; Booth, supra note 9, at 1604 n.23, 1605 n.26; Rapp, supra
note 9, at 194-217 (discussing history of use of fiduciary concepts relative to suitability);
cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE'S MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k)(7)(ii) (1998).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958) (requiring exercise of
skill and care normally possessed by other professionals); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965).
145. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the shingle theory.
146. 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). Congress and courts have interpreted fiduci
ary status in terms of a functional standard based on actual facts and circumstances. See
Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 613 (7th
Cir. 1995); 120 CONGo REc. 3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3
21(c)(1)(1999); see also 29 U.S.c. § 1104(a)(1) (1994) (An ERISA fiduciary must "dis
charge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims."); 29 U.S.C. § 1l06(b) (1994) (ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from
"deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account," or
"receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with
such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan."); 29 U.S.c.
§ 1109(a) (1994) (personal liability results from violation of fiduciary duty); NLRB V.
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (An ERISA's fiduciary duty is the most
fundamental of his or her duties, and "must be enforced with uncompromising rigid
ity."); Schloegel V. Boswell, 994 F.2d 266, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1993); Lowen V. Tower Asset
Mgmt, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1987) (This duty, the violation of which sub
jects a fiduciary to personal liability, is directed particularly at schemes "tainted by a
conflict of interest and thus highly susceptible to self dealing."); Donovan V. Bierwirth,
680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (The requirement that an ERISA fiduciary act "with an
eye single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries."); H.R. CONF. REp. No.
1280; Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. Part 2509.96-1(d)(1999); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 425(b) (1958); Lisa S. Kahn & Laura M. Metcalfe, The Broker
Dealer As Fiduciary Under ERISA: Defending Claims by ERISA Plans for Recovery of
Their Trading Losses, in 3 INVESTMENT LAW. 8,9 (Sept. 1996); cf 29 U.S.c. § 1002(38)
(1994) (defining "investment manager"); Martin V. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669 (8th Cir.
1992) (discussing accountants providing recommendations regarding transactions and
investment advice found to be fiduciaries); Miller V. Lay Trucking Co., 606 F. Supp.
1326 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 989 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding insurance agent unin
tentionally listed as plan administrator and who provided investment and other advice
to be a fiduciary); Brink V. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374-75 (D. Md. 1980) (finding
insurance agent to be a fiduciary based on discretionary authority and customer reli
ance on advice rendered). See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at
1591-92 (discussing how the thin line between investment advice constituting effective
control or mere influence is therefore critical to establishing fiduciary status).
147. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 173-174, 181, 227,230-31 (1959).
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cern as contractual relations and commission arrangements argua
bly taint producers' loyalties. 148 The characterization of a
producer's fidelity to his or her customer as either that of an ordi
nary person, or alternatively, that of a fiduciary, can have a dra
matic effect on whether a court will apply either a de novo or an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 149
Courts have also struggled to impute a fidelity standard appli
cable to producers through analogies to the duty of an attorney or
accountant to his or her c1ients,15o Unfortunately, since neither at
torneys151 nor accountants 152 are bound by a clear code of conduct
that acknowledges the presumably paramount interests of custom
148. The present front-end commission structure used by insurance companies
has been viewed as a possible source of conflict of interest for producers in fulfilling
their duties to customers. See Ronald l)uskli, The Ethics of Reward Systems in the
Financial Services Industry, Address at The Americlin College (Aug. 25, 1998) (tran~
script on file with author). Most insurance companies pay a significant portion of the
first year's premium to the producer as a commission with nominal "trail" commissions
paid over subsequent years. In contrast, a "leveled" commission structure pays a lower
flat commission to the producer over a longer time period. See Ke~sler, supra note 44,
at 546; I.M.S.A. Indicator 5.3.b.3, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 78
(using persistency trends used to identify root causes of complaints). See generally An
derson & Winslow, supra note 9, at 108 (describing churning cases); Booth, supra note
9, at 1603 n.20 (explaining that churning arises in the context of a breach of fiduciary
duty for unsuitable recommendations based on the producer's failure to disclose the
fact that the reason for the trading is to benefit the broker (through commissions)
rather than the customer); id. at 1610 (explaining that brokers sometimes recommend
riskier securities because they are paid higher commissions). Studies have shown, how
ever, that commissions do not necessarily motivate producers in recommending prod
ucts to their customers. See Duska, supra, at 7 n.lO (citing comments from the 1998
Zicklin CenterlWharton Impact Conference of Ethical Issues in Financial Services).
Rather, moral belief in the welfare of others, behavioral controls, and the operative
business environment were better determinative factors for producer conduct. Id. at 7

8.
149. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
150. See Kanter v. Dietelbaum, 648 N.E.2d 1137, 1139-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);
Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1980); HOLMES, supra note 125; see
also Kessler, supra note 44, at 541 ("The duties and liabilities of the insurance agent are
basically the same as in the c'ase of other pr:ofessionals. The agent must act in good
faith ... and exercise such reasonable skill and ordinary diligence as may be fairly
expected from a person in his situation.").
151. Attorneys are not bound by a professional code to ,hold their customers'
interest paramount. See, e.g., CONN. CT. R.P.C. 1.7. Lawyers may enter into business
relations that may be adverse to a customer provided the terms are fair and reasonable
to the customer (as disclosed in an understandable written disclosure) and the customer
agrees in writing to the same. See CONN. CT. R.P.c. 1.8.
152. See generally CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 20-280-15c(a), (b) & (e) (1998)
(stating that certified public accountants must be independent and act with integrity and
objectivity).
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ers, such as the Hippocratic Oath,153 the exact degree of loyalty of a
producer to stand in support of his or her recommendations re
mains uncertain.
D.

Market Conduct Oversight

Two of the ways that the life insurance industry has attempted
to indirectly control suitability as a form of market conduct include
the adoption of broad-based trade practice regulations and the es
tablishment of self-regulatory standards. The core of state regula
tory efforts to oversee market conduct is embodied in various forms
of the NAIC Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, which has been
adopted by most states. 154 The Unfair Trade Practices Act was
adopted based on the specific invitation of Congress155 and "to as
sure the ouster of [Federal Trade Commission] jurisdiction."156 The
act is notable for many reasons including its breadth and penal
ties. 157 One commentator also characterized the act as a "code of
ethics" for the insurance business. 158 The act indirectly regulates
suitability through prohibitions against general misrepresent a
tions,159 misrepresenting a producer's qualifications to provide in
vestment advice,160 and defaming another insurer.1 61
The Insurance Marketplace Standards Association ("IMSA")
was established to promote ethical marketplace conduct,162 thereby
153. For instance, the Oath of Hippocrates setting forth the duties of a physician
to patients includes "I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability
and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
deleterious and mischievous." BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1st
ed. 1953).
154. See Unfair Trade Practices Act § 4(A) & (C), V NAIC Model Reg. Servo
880-2 to -3 (Jan. 1993); see also Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act § 4(A), V NAIC
Model Reg. Servo 900-2 (July 1991). See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note
9, at 1593 (construing blue sky laws to include suitability).
155. See Unfair Trade Practices Act §1, V NAIC Model Reg. Servo at 880-1 (Jan.
1993).
156. Legislative History, Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, at 880-19;
see JON S. HANSON, REGULATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS 97 (1996).
157. See Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, §§ 6-11. See generally HAN
SON, supra note 156, at 123-25; Burke A. Christensen, Advertising and Privacy, in Mc
GILL'S LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 259-60 (Edward E. Graves & Burke A.
Christensen eds., 1996).
158. HANSON, supra note 156, at 98.
159. See Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, § 4(A).
160. See id. § 4(M).
161. See id. § 4(C).
162. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1. The Securities and Ex
change Commission has interpreted NASD suitability standards as being an ethical
yardstick for measuring producer conduct. See In re Burkes, 51 S.E.C. 356, 360 (1993),
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bolstering consumer confidence in the life insurance industry.1 63
Prerequisites to membership include, among other things, certifying
that the member thoroughly embraces the importance of suitability
by teaching producers about suitability,164 monitoring whether pro~
ducers use "needs based" selling concepts to ensure the suitability
of their recommendations,165 prohibiting improper replacements,166
and discouraging defamatory statements regarding another
company.167
E.

Common Law Detrimental Reliance

The doctrine of detrimental reliance has also found wide-scale
favor in resolving disputes involving presumed ambiguities in con
nection with the type or scope of insurance sold. 168 There is no
reason to suspect that this equitable concept could not be applied,
directly or indirectly, to suitability claims. The insured must prove
the essential elements of a reliance claim, including that a represen
tation, promise or other act existed,169 that the maker of the repre
sentation expected others to rely on such representation, that the
recipient justifiably relied on such representation to his or her detri
ment, and, as a result, that the recipient/insured suffered some ad
verse consequence.1 70
affd 29 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1994); Mundheim, supra note 9, at 464-66 (noting that the
concept of suitability originated, and was intended to remain, as an ethical principle).
163. Robert E. Googins, IMSA Delivers Consumer Confidence, GAMA INT'L J.
40 (Nov.-Dec. 1998).
164. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 54 (advocating train
ing procedures to ensure that employees understand the suitability requirements).
165. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 43-46, 55 (describing
practices that companies should follow to monitor their sales employees).
166. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 62.
167. IMSA Principle 3 requires that producers and insurers refrain from disparag
ing competitors. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 65.
168. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.5(a) (Practi
tioner's ed. 1988). For a general discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
see Kenneth S. Abraham, fudge-Made Law and fudge-Made Insurance: Ho~wring The
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981); Roger C. Hender
son, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18
CONN. L. REv. 323 (1986); Peter N. Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. LJ. 729 (2000).
169. This may take the form of an express or implied statement that a recommen
dation is suitable. Producers may be a source of exposure to manufacturers especially
where customer expectations are not managed properly and a customer is simply led to
a single product. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.5(c)
nA (Practitioner's ed. 1988).
170. See Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1400 (8th Cir. 1992); Myers v. Finkle,
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THE SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSAL PARADIGM

The absence of a universal suitability paradigm is a problem
for customers and producers/manufacturers171 alike. As the preced
ing discussion indicates, suitability standards may depend on
whether the customer is vulnerable, astute, or rich. Different stan
dards apply if the product recommended is a traditional product,
variable product or a replacement product. The purchase of a varia
ble product from within a bank is subject to one set of rules that
have no relevance to the purchase of the very same product from
the broker-dealer next door. The sale of a traditional product is
subject to altogether different procedures depending on whether it
is sold at a bank branch, the broker-dealer next door, the law firm
around the corner, or the insurance agency across town. These
rules also change when crossing state lines and may have absolutely
no application to products online.
Compliance with suitability laws, regulations, and regulators'
biases172 also presents a formidable challenge for supervisors173 and
950 F.2ct 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d
910,918 (6th Cir. 1991); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Ken
nedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708
F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983). The viability of a § lO(b) unsuitability claim requires
the plaintiff to prove:
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that
the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the
buyer's needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuita
ble securities for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose
material information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that
the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent
conduct.
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
171. See generally LIFE INS. & ANNumES MODEL REG. §§ 4-7, 8(D), III NAIC
Model Reg. Servo 613-5 to -10 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (July 2000) (oversight duties
and penalties); LIFE INS. DISCLOSURE MODEL REG. § 2(A), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo
580-3 to -6 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Oct. 2000); NTM 99-35, supra note 11 (discuss
ing the applicability of suitability guidelines to wholesalers); District Directors Securities
Conference Open Forum, 13.2 REG. & COMPLIANCE ALERT 13 (1999) available at http://
www.nasdr.com (stating that "firms share responsibility for implementing supervisory
procedures focused on suitability"); The Obligations of Underwriters, Brokers and
Dealers in Distributing and Trading Securities, Particularly of New High Risk Ventures,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-5275, 34-9671 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) <JI 4506B, at 4058-59 (Mar. 16, 1988) ("[V]iolations of suitability rules may
involve fact patterns which also would constitute violations of ... securities acts."). See
infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervisory problems with
regard to producers.
172. See Paul Roye, Director, Variable Insurance Products: The ChaJlenges of a
New Millennium, Keynote Address Before the ALI-ABA Conference on Life Insur
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employeesP4 A well-founded fear of regulatory175 and civil expo
ance Company Products: Current Securities, Tax, ERISA, and State Regulatory Issues
(Oct. 19, 2000) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch409.htm; Paul Roye,
Director, Understanding the Securities Products of Insurance Companies, Keynote Ad
dress Before the Practicing Law Institute (Jan. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch455.htm;Jackson.supranote16.at 348 (vague
standards are subject to opportunistic enforcement). The Office of Compliance Inspec
tions and Examinations ("bCIE") established by the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion oversees market conduct and sales practices. In late December, 1996, the SEC's
Division of Enforcement and OCIE initiated inquiries focusing on replacement activi
ties involving variable products with a particular emphasis on the suitability of premium
financing (i.e., using existing cash values to fund premium obligations for replaced
products). This inquiry led to an enforcement action under Section 17(a) of the Securi
ties Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 involving
churning. In re Parkins, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 43336 (Sept. 25, 2000), availa
ble at 2000 WL 1375473.
173. See Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E), 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 25,051, at
18,084 (Dec. 12, 1990) (providing broker-dealer sanctions for failure to reasonably su
pervise others so as to prevent violations of governing laws and regulations); see also
Exchange Act § 15(b)(6)(A)(i), 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 25,055, at 18,085-6 (Aug.
14, 1996) (providing for suspension, bar, or censure for violating supervisory obliga
tions). See generally In re First Sees. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 592-93 (1961) (spot-checking
required to identify unsuitable sales); In re Boren & Co., 40 S.E.c. 217, 226 (1960)
(stating that sales personnel must be actively supervised for suitability). Securities su
pervision is affected through qualified principals. See NASD Membership & Registra
tion Rules 1021, 1023, NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
Supervision, NASD Conduct 301O(a)(2), (4)-(6), NASD Manual & Notices to Members
(1998), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
N.Y.S.E. Rule 342(b)(1), N.Y.S.E. Const. & Rules (CCH) 'lI 2342, at 3585 (Nov. 1993);
NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 301 (review of customer information); NASDProvides
Guidance on Supervisory Responsibilities, NASD Notice to Members 99-45, June 1999,
1999 WL 33176539 (NationallFederal); NASD Regulation Provides Interpretive Gui
dance on Registration Requirements, NASD Notice to Members 99-49, June 1999, 1999
WL 33176543 (NationallFederal); NASD Regulation Requests Comment on Requiring
Chief Compliance Officers To Be Registered, NASD Notice to Members 99-51, June
1999, 1999 WL 33176545 (NationallFederal). See generally In re Chancellor Capital
Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release. No. IA-1447, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2204
(Oct. 18, 1994), available at 1994 WL 570098; In re Feldman, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7014, 55 S.E.c. Docket 9 (Sept. 20, 1993), available at 1993 WL 370958; In re Gut
freund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-1554, 52 S.E.C. Docket 2849 (Dec. 3,1992), avail
able at 1992 WL 362753; Simon M. Lome, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers
Before the SEC, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Bus
iness Law Section (Aug. 1995); Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks to the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Oct. 5, 1993) (discussing liability of compliance officers and
attorneys for failure to supervise).
174. See generally Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1991) (insurer received notices and complaints of fraud);
IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 84. In life insurance companies, su
pervisory responsibilities can be horizontally and vertically stratified. Intra-departmen
tal supervision of needs analysis and use of fact finders can also be broken down to
functional categories such as direct/primary responsibility (producers, field coordinators
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sure176 drives the development of policies and procedures intended
to ensure supervision of producers conducting suitability analyses.
These policies and procedures necessitate a commitment to the pro
curement of supervisory staff capable of meeting with producers on
a meaningful basis 177 and effectively overseeing compliance.178
and underwriting), process management (field managers and home office middle man
agers), oversight (distribution management), monitoring/auditing (compliance and au
dit) and interpretation/advice (law department). Unlike their securities counterparts,
life insurance supervisors need not demonstrate their expertise by passing mastery ex
aminations. Cf Supervision, NASD Conduct Rule 3010(a)(6), supra note 173; Regis
tration, NASD Membership and Registration 1021, 1022, 1070, supra note 173.
175.· See, e.g., In re Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. v. Cruz, No. C8A930048, 1997 WL
33101218 (Nat'l Bus. Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997).
176. See Bridget O'Brian, Prudential Fined $20 Million by NASD over Its Sales of
Variable Life Insurance, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1999, at Cl. See generally NTM 01-23,
supra note 11 (excessive trading and. churning are examples of unsuitable
recommendations).
177. Supervisors are required to conduct periodic personal meetings with all pro
ducers no less frequently than annually, and preferably on an unannounced basis. See
NASD Conduct Rule 3010(a)(8) & (c), supra note 173 (annual inspection of all OSJs
and cyclical examinations of branch offices). See generally In re NYLife Secs. Inc., Ex
change Act Release No. 34-40459, 68 S.E.c. Docket 103 (Sep. 23, 1998), available at
1998 WL 646712 (audit customer files); In re Royal Alliance Assocs., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-38174, 63 S.E.c. Docket 1606, (Jan. 15, 1997), available at 1997 WL
13023 (failure to effectively supervise for reasons which included ineffective on-site au
dit protocol); In re Conso!. Inv. Servs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-36687, 61
S.E.C. Docket 19 (Jan. 5, 1996), available at 1996 WL 20829 (compliance question
naires). This inspection must determine whether the agency and its personnel, whether
centralized or detached, are complying with company policies and procedures and with
the requirements of applicable laws and regulations. The purpose of such meeting is to,
among other things, examine files and records for examples or patterns of possible
problematic sales or solicitations, to provide an opportunity for producers to ask ques
tions and receive guidance regarding compliance concerns, and to present regulatory-,
policy- and compliance-related issues. See NASD Conduct Rule 301O(c), supra note
173. See generally Unfair Trade Practices Act § 4(J) V NAIC Model Regulation Service
at 880-6 (Jan. 1993) (records requirements).
178. See IMSA Princ. 6, Question 6.1, Indicator 6.l.a.2, and Question 6.2, Indica
tors 6.2.a.7 & 6.2.b.3, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 81, 84; FED
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL §§ 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k), 8C2.5(f) (stating that a
reduction in culpability score is based upon the presence of an "effective program to
prevent and detect violations of law"); see also In re Conso!. Inv. Servs., Inc., 52 S.E.C.
582 (1996) (providing analysis of the standards of reasonableness under the section
15(b)(4)(E) safe harbor). In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission developed a benchmark for effective internal control systems
that included five components of control: environment, risk assessment, control activi
ties, information and communication, and monitoring. William C. Jennings & Peter C.
Sutherland, Internal Control Systems Help Insurers Reduce Risk, BEST'S REv. LIFE
HEALTH INS. ED. 72 (Jan. 1996), available at 1996 WL 8831049. But see FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, supra, § 8C2.5(f) (stating that a rebuttable pre
sumption of ineffectiveness of compliance with the program exists where high level
personnel participate in violations or where, after becoming aware of an offense, the
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Manuals must be periodically updatedY9 Training,180. including
ethics awareness 181 and needs based selling,182 must also occur.
However, the very existence of these policies and procedures cre
ates exposure in the absence of conscientious monitoring.
The challenge of adequately supervising producers becomes
even more stringent as distribution channels I83 become more dif
fuse through detached 184 and independent producers and bro
kers. 185 This contrasts with an environment in which all producers
organization unreasonably delayed reporting the offense to appropriate governmental
authorities).
179. See NASD Conduct Rule 301O(b)(4), NASD Manual & Notices to Members
(1999), available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm.
180. See NASD Membership and Registration Rules, NASD Manual & Notices
to Members'll 1120 (May 1999) available at
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm;
IMSA Princ. 2, Codes C-F, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 54-59.
181. See 1MSA Princ. 1, Code C & IMSA Princ. 6, Code A, IMSA ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 48, 81.
182. IMSA Princ. 1, Code A, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at
42.
183. For the purposes hereof, "distribution channels" refers to the various ways
that manufacturers use producers to solicit and sell their products. For instance, manu
facturers may distribute their products through brokers or career agents, or they could
distribute through channels based on the type of product or geographic region. The life
insurance industry had traditionally used an agency system to distribute its products.
Under this system, the manufacturer's "home office" would supervise the activities of
"field" offices or agencies through an agency manager. In the current environment,
however, manufacturers have either abandoned or diminished their dependence on the
agency system. These circumstances affect the ability of home office management to
monitor the activities of field producers.
184. As used herein, the term "detached producers" refers to producers who sell
products from locations other than agencies established by manufacturers or perhaps
the home office of the manufacturer (for example, sales from a producer's home).
Proximity of supervisors to the producers that they supervise is one measure of the
effectiveness of supervision. See generally NASD Notice to Members 98-38, NASD
Reminds Members of Supervisory and Inspection Obligations (May 1998) (stating that
firms should consider the number and location of its registered principals in terms of its
capability to effectively supervise unregistered office personnel); NASD Notice to
Members 99-45, NASD Provides Guidance on Supervisory Responsibilities, at 300 (Jun.
1999) (discussing one-on-one supervision requirements); NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at
303. IMSA has likewise endorsed a supervisory system modeled on NASD require
ments. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of this supervisory
system.
185. Manufacturers typically have less control over "independent producers"
(Le., producers appointed to represent many manufacturers). Manufacturers "appoint"
producers to sell their products in a particular state. Independent producers may also
be contractually bound to adhere to that manufacturer's particular solicitation stan
dards as a result of being appointed. Such contractual arrangements may allow the
producer and manufacturer to negotiate how supervision will be affected. See 1MSA
Princ. 6, Code B cmts.; Question 6.2, Indicator 6.1.a.4, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK,
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work in centralized locations under the watchful eyes of their super
visors. Supervisory mandates based on a centralized distribution
concept could have the effect of forcing manufacturers to decide
whether the cost of compliance is disproportionate to the cost asso
ciated with under-supervising decentralized producers. Thus, man
ufacturers face the difficult question of trying to appease regulators
by adopting unenforceable or unenforced policies and leaving the
impossible task of enforcement to ill-equipped and under-sup
ported compliance departments. One possible solution to this di
lemma could be to adopt an overarching suitability mission
statement.
One simplistic mission statement could be that producers and
manufacturers must work together to "[s]ell the right policy to the
right prospect in the right way."186 Criteria used to fulfill this mis
sion then would depend on making certain decisions as an industry
and at each level along the distribution path of product solicitation.
First, a determination must be made whether suitability is an out
come-oriented objective to later measure the efficacy of advice or a
process that can be reliably measured and monitored. Once that is
determined, other issues should be resolved. These include
whether the rule should protect customers from producers/manu
facturers or attempt to level the playing field among producers and
on what basis appropriate regulatory oversight should be
established.
A.

Should Suitability Be an Outcome- or a Process-Oriented
Objective?
The development of any model suitability standard depends on

supra note 44, at 83-84. The growing use of independent producers caused great diffi
culties for insurance companies seeking 1MSA membership under its original code. The
initial code placed many oversight responsibilities on manufacturers. See, e.g., IMSA
Princ. 6, Code B cmt. 1, 1MSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 83 (stating
that before allowing an independent producer to sell its products, the insurer ascertains
the good character, business repute, qualifications, and training of the producer in ac
cordance with IMSA Principle 2, Code A); NASD Conduct Rule 301O(e), NASD Man
ual (CCH) 91 3010, at 4834 (Nov. 1999); IMSA Princ. 2, Code A, 1MSA ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 51. See generally In re Mabon, Mugent & Co., 47 S.E.C.
862,867 (1983) (discussing supervision of sales activities); NTM 97-19, NASD Regula
tion and New York Stock Exchange Memorandum Discusses Sweep Report and Pro
vides Guidance on Heightened Supervision Recommendations (Apr. 1997).
186. Kessler, supra note 44, at 545. See generally KREITNER, supra note 50, at 111
(stating that doing things right the first time is a critical component of total quality
management).
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whether suitability is to be evaluated as a process, a process and
structure, or measured by outcome.
1.

Process Orientation

A process-oriented approach would attempt to ensure that as
long as a reliable 187 process was used to determine the appropriate
ness of a recommendation, neither the producer nor the manufac
turer would be held liable if the results failed to meet the
customer's expectations. A process orientation should require an
adequate "top-down" commitment to the process, and a willingness
to discipline any non-compliant producer. This approach also de
pends on a series of accepted "norms" which would need to be es
tablished in the financial services industry for each manufacturer
and producer. This approach could be criticized, however, on the
basis that the use of norms stifles autonomy and creativity. An
other criticism of a process orientation is that an unsatisfied cus
tomer may have no recourse against a producer who followed the
process of determining the suitability of their recommendations.
2.

Process and Structure Orientation

An alternative to a pure process orientation would be to estab
lish a process and structure orientation. This type of orientation
would incorporate all of the process considerations noted above,
but also add the concept of checks and balances through the inclu
sion of various hierarchical forms of supervision. The NASD ap
proach to broker-dealer supervision generally embraces this type of
approach.188 For instance, the broker-dealer would first adopt a
compliance code that addresses suitability as an important consider
ation. 189 Product manufacturers could also develop their own inter
nal requirements for confirming the suitability of recommendations
in connection with new product sales and replacements. 190 Supervi
sory chains would then be deployed to oversee that these com
mandments are complied with and that repercussion's follow from
non-compliance 191 as suggested by the NASD and IMSA.1 92 One
drawback to this approach is that it might not be appropriate for
187. See generally KREITNER, supra note 50, at 109.
188. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NASD
supervisory structure.
189. See supra note 178.
190. See supra notes 95-96, 177.
191. See supra note 178.
192. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
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new or novel distribution channels. For example, a hierarchical su
pervisory structure may be alien to banks that have historically
given platform customer service representatives the exclusive au
thority to oversee their own suitability analysis.
3.

Outcome Orientation

Another alternative would be to develop a standard based en
tirely on outcomes. Under such an approach, the appropriate in
quiry would be whether the customer was harmed in any way by the
recommendation. Obviously, public confidence could be bolstered
by such a standard. There are good reasons, however, why out
comes should not be the primary measure of suitability. First, the
desired "outcome" cannot be discovered until it is too late for the
producer or manufacturer to do anything about it. Even if pro
ducer and customer expectations appear to be aligned at the time of
sale (i.e. through commissions for the producer and the prospect of
positive returns for the customer), inherent incongruencies exist
since the customer alone will suffer from subsequent performance
disappointment. Moreover, an outcome orientation cannot discern
the "trusting sweet widow" from the "greedy old lady." As dis
cussed above, it could be argued that we have already migrated to
an outcome orientation. However, if outcomes continue to be a
basis to judge suitability, producers and manufactures will be and
remain as investment intermediaries guaranteeing investment re
sults. As a result, the cost associated with correcting the outcome
of recommendations will continue to factor into product prices that
will then be cross-subsidized by all other customers.
Second, an outcome orientation does not recognize the impor
tance of product costs and their impact on how customers may
make their investment decisions. 193 A broader range of ostensibly
suitable products usually exists than a customer may be able to af
ford. The customer's value perception of whether any alternative
product is "affordable," "affordable with strain," or "unaffordable"
may lead to vastly different outcomes. These perceptions are also
dependent upon the customer's sense of urgency at the moment of
solicitation. For instance, most people would say that they would
buy as much insurance as possible if they thought that they would
die tomorrow. If they thought that they might live just a little bit
193. See generally DIREcr RESPONSE, supra note 16 (stating that sixty-eight per
cent of respondents indicated that cost of insurance was the most important factor in
their buying decision).
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longer, however, this assumption may no longer hold true. A pure
outcome orientation that includes this, and other subjective cus
tomer decisions, therefore leads the financial services industry no
further than their present stead.
On the other hand, it can be argued that an outcome orienta
tion may be best suited for egregious cases involving outright fraud
and material misrepresentations. Accordingly, fact patterns involv
ing these factors should continue to frame the "easy" cases involv
ing suitability.
B.

Whom Should Suitability Protect?

Not all customers may need protection against their own in
vestment decisions. For instance, many securities regulators ac
knowledge that "sophisticated" customers seem to be able to fend
for themselves. 194 In an environment where a great deal of finan
cial data is now readily available in the public domain, should all
other customers be entitled to second-guess their decisions?
"Boiler-room" sales cases involving high pressure tactics used by
some unscrupulous stock brokers may have led to the establishment
of a sympathetic "little old widow" benchmark. In reality, the rea
sonably prudent person would make a more reliable standard.1 95
This lowest common denominator approach is therefore flawed be
cause those people who, despite disclosures, still cannot adequately
fathom the nature of their investment would require an unlimited
number of other protections against a producer and themselves.1 96

C.

Leveling the Playing Field Among Producers

The present environment, where different producers are sub
ject to different suitability duties, creates an unfair advantage to
less-regulated producers. The "best advice" standard adopted in
the United Kingdom presents one model for leveling the playing
field among these different types of producers. English solicitation
194. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the sophisticated securities customer.
195. See generally Marc A. ,Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Is
sues, Reform Proposals and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1319,1363-66 (1996) (stating
that the Federal Trade Commission's authority to prohibit "unfair" practices is pre
mised on a "reasonable" purchaser standard is appropriate relative to insurance, securi
ties and managed care).
196. See generally Csordas v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., No. CI91
1764,1992 WL 426460, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Juiy 16, 1992) ("[T]he broker must explain to
the customer the risks of purchasing a security in such a way that would enable the
customer to relate the risks of the transaction to his risk threshold and thus make the
independent determination himself of whether or not to purchase the security.").
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regulations were developed in the early 1980s following a series of
market conduct scandals.1 97 The Financial Services Act ("Code")
of 1986198 led to the establishment of self-regulatory organiza
tions.1 99 The United Kingdom regulator, the Financial Services Au
thority, and its predecessor, LAUTRO (Life Assurance and Unit
Trust Regulatory Organisation), have imposed significant fines and
penalties for breaches of the Code.2°O
The "Conduct of Business Rules"201 were intended to "pro
mote high standards of integrity and fair dealing" by representa
tives while interacting with customers, and to "make proper
provision for requiring an authorised person to act with due skill,
care, and diligence ...."202 The Code addresses producer conduct
with a potential customer. The Financial Services Authority also in
troduced the concept of "polarisation," which means that any sales
representative must either be independent (i.e., a broker in the
United States) and be able to demonstrate independence ("Inde
pendent Financial Advisers")203 or, alternatively, must be a repre
sentative of only one company, selling only products of his or her
host company (so-called "tied advisors" or "appointed representa
tives").204 This allegiance disclosure also exists, for example, for
Connecticut real estate brokers or salespersons who must disclose
their affiliation with either the property buyer or seller205 in a
signed written statement before the first personal meeting with
prospects. 206
U.K. regulations apply a "best advice" standard only to inde
197. See generally Ross JONES, UK REGULATION (LIMRA International 1997)
(discussing the development of insurance brokers regulations in the United Kingdom).
198. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60 (Eng.).
199. Id. § 48; see also id. §§ 10, 15 (1986); JONES, supra note 197, at 6.
200. See, e.g., Alison Smith, Life Insurers Face Jump in Fines, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993 (stating that fines expected to start at more than £200,000); Carol
O'Leary, UK: Insurers Fail Lautro Test, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 19, 1994
(noting that Norwich Union suspended all its 800 insurance salesmen in response to
being fined £325,000, including costs); Robert Miller, Life Insurers Face Swinging Fines,
LONDON TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994 (stating that some of Britain's leading life insurance com
panies have been subject to fines, which together with costs, would top £500,000).
201. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 48 (Eng.).
202. Id. sch. 8, §§ 1-2.
203. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY GUIDE TO FrNANCIAL ADVICE 13 (May
2000) (discussing two main types of financial advisers), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/index-chrono-2oo0.html [hereinafter FSA GUIDE].
204. Id.
205. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20"325d (2001).
206. Id.·
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pendent financial advisers.207 These representatives must take into
account all aspects of a customer's circumstances when giving ad
vice. 208 Customer information and recommendations are typically
recorded on a "fact find."209 The independent financial adviser
must only recommend a product that is suitable, taking into account
the customer's circumstances. 210 Independent financial advisers
must not recommend any contract if none is suitable-a closest fit
is not acceptable.2 11 The independent financial adviser must also
reasonably believe that there is no other investment or product that
is likely to secure the customer's investment objectives "more
advantageously. "212
The U.K. customer must be given sufficient information to
make an informed decision. 213 For example, the independent finan
cial adviser must give a "key features" disclosure containing a gen
eral description of the particular product that is being
recommended, including charges, policy benefits, and any associ
ated risks.214 This disclosure is intended to be a "short and punchy
synopsis of the product which is easy to read and capable of being
understood by the investor."215 Commissions or other remunera
tion must also be disclosed upon request, or, in any case, prior to
completion of the application. 216 Finally, a "reason why" letter pro
207. See PERSONAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY LIMITED, PIA RULE BOOK,
ADOPTED SIB (CONDUCT OF BUSINESS) RULE, § 5.02 (June 1997) [hereinafter PIA
RULE BOOK]; Robert W. Stein, Product Suitability Looms As Market Conduct Hurdle,
97 BEST'S REv. LIFE-HEALTH INS., Dec. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 13935485; Hill
Gallagher, Learning from the U.K.'s Disclosure Experience, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE
& HEALTH-FIN. SERVICES., Feb. 3, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9318794 ("[I]f one com
pany is getting a disproportionate share of an agent's business, that agent will be re
quired to demonstrate that 'best advice' was given in cases involving that insurer").
208. See PIA RULE BOOK, supra note 207, § 3.01 (May 1995).
209. JONES, supra note 197, at 9. A fact finding is not required for unsolicited
sales. [d.
210. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 4 (Eng.); PIA RULE BOOK, supra
note 207, §§ 5.01-5.02.
211. See Stein, supra note 207.
212. PIA RULE BOOK, supra note 207, § 5.02(1); cf id. § 5.03.
213. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 7 (Eng.).
214. FSA GUIDE, supra note 203, at 13. The Key Features Disclosure must in
clude projected benefits illustrations, projected surrender values over the first five
years, and subsequent quinquennial years to maturity, a description of the effects of
deductions and an overall description of the policy. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK, IN
SURANCE BULLETIN LIFE ASSURANCE PRODUCT AND COMMISSION DISCLOSURE -THE
NEW RULES 2 (June 1994).
215. TILLINGHAST INSURANCE UPDATE, NEW PRODUCT DISCLOSURE RULES, 2
(July 1, 1994).
216. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 5 (Eng.); PIA RULE BOOK, supra
note 207, § 5.13; see also KPMG PEAT MARWICK, supra note 214, at 3; Gallagher, supra
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vides full details of the advantages and disadvantages of any poten
tial replacement must be given no later than the cancellation
notice. 217
While the U.K. best advice system led to criticism,218 there is
an appeal to forcing an allegiance disclosure at the onset of solicita
tion activities. Such a standard is also generally consistent with the
existing duties of U.S. property insurance brokers to find the best
available coverage219 and the overall recognition in U.S. agency law
of the loyalty of a broker as compared to an agent. 220
D.

Who Should Oversee Suitability?

The concept of functional regulation within the Gramm-Leach
Bliley Act sets one possible framework for the consolidation of reg
ulatory oversight.221 The United Kingdom best advice system pro
vides an alternative model based on a centralized self-regulatory
authority overseeing sales. By way of comparison, the Connecticut
Department of Consumer Protection oversees real estate agent dis
cipline regardless of the type of recommendation involved. 222 Simi
larly, quality oversight deployed by Managed Care Organizations
(MCOs) provides another possible structure for regulating the effi
cacy of recommendations.223
note 207 (noting that disclosure of acquisition costs rather than commissions would be
more meaningful to consumers).
217. KPMG PEAT MARWlCK, supra note 214, at 2; see also Financial Services Act,
1986, sch. 8, § 5 (Eng.).
218. NANCY D. BOYNTON, LIMRA INTERNATIONAL INC., BEYOND THE WAVE
MARKET CONDUCT IN A MARKET SEA CHANGE 6-8 (1996) (stating that in the year in
which disclosure regulations first went into effect, the number of new policies sold in
the U.K. dropped to the lowest point since the 1970's). See generally Gallagher, supra
note 207 (stating that the cost of doing business by independents increased as syndicates
charged fees to perform due diligence on possible product recommendations).
219. See generally HOLMES, supra note 125, at 423 (noting that once a heightened
standard of care is found to exist, the producer may have a duty to procure the best
available coverage); Darner Motor Sales Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682
P.2d 388, 403 n.14 (Ariz. 1984) ("'[Clompany agents' are held to a somewhat lower
standard than 'independent agents' ....").
220. See Eglin & Rogers, supra note 125, at 113-15; HOLMES, supra note 125, at
425-37.
221. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 133 Stat. 1338 (1999) (providing
that insurance activities of any persons shall be "functionally" regulated by the states);
see also Jackson, supra note 16, at 387-98 (analyzing functional regulation).
222. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-311a(a), b(2) (1999).
223. The health field has historically been concerned about the quality of its ser
vices to patients. See David Blumenthal, The Origins of the Quality-of-Care Debate, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1146 (1996); David Blumenthal, Quality of Care - What Is It?, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 891 (1996); Robert H. Brook et ai., Measuring Quality of Care, 335
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One particular appeal of the MCO system may lie in its defer
ence to professional peers to assess the effectiveness of utilization
review programs. 224 The MCO industry has also submitted to pri
vate accrediting to increase consumer confidence. 225 These quality
assurance initiatives, bolstered by the recent passage of a "con
sumer bill of rights,"226 could provide significant inspiration to the
financial services industry. Applying this approach, there are op
portunities for IMSA to model itself after the National Committee
for Quality Assurance 227 or similar self-regulated credentialing au
thorities. These initiatives could also be combined with peer suita
bility review228 based on a consumer bill of rights, thereby ensuring
both a commitment by producers to conduct an adequate suitability
analysis and a consumer's obligation to assume accountability for
becoming as familiar as possible with the consequences of his or her
investment decisions.
NEW ENG. J. MED. 966 (1996); Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of Care, 335
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060 (1996); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 156-58 (1996). The
relatively recent advent of managed care organizations (MCOs) has accentuated the
conflict between patient care and cost containment measures. The service provider in
these organizations is presently challenged to defend both the efficacy and the cost
effectiveness of his or her advice.
224. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-41 (Michie 1999).
225. See sources cited supra note 217.
226. See Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry, Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Report to the
President of the United States (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.hcqualitycommis
sion.gov/cborr/.
227. The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) is a private, not
for-profit organization dedicated to assessing and reporting on the quality of managed
care plans. The NCQA accredits MCOs through a voluntary program. NCQA cur
rently uses Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a standardized
performance measurement matrix, to ensure that customers have certain information
needed to compare MCOs. HEDIS 2000 contains fifty-six measures, seventeen of which
are dedicated to effectiveness of care.). Diagnostics are considered as well as mecha
nisms used to ensure consistent review. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 58-17C-37(2),
(4), (5) (2000). The utilization review program itself is also periodically evaluated to
assure ongoing efficiency and continued improvement. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 58-17C-38 (2000). It is interesting to note that the self-evaluation aspects contem
plated by this process represented a significant impediment to the life insurance indus
try's acceptance of the 1MSA self-evaluation process. The adoption of a limited
privilege for such assessments in states such as Illinois represents the type of protections
thought to be so essential in the life insurance industry. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMPo STAT.
5/155.35 (2001).
228. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assess
ment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1674-81 (1992) (stating that a de
novo review standard would be preferable to ex post judicial assessments).
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Managing Customer Expectations

Whatever standard emerges, or even if no standard emerges,
producers should be encouraged to manage customer expectations
at the time of solicitation and, ideally, throughout the duration of
their relationship. Managing customer expectations is a multi-step
process that starts with a producer matching his or her knowledge
of the customer's needs, aspirations, and risk tolerance with his or
her presumably thorough knowledge of his or her preferred manu
facturer's products, and others available in the marketplace. 229
Suitability is, and will remain, a process of finding a range of
products that may satisfy a customer's needs and objectives to vary
ing degrees. Producers would therefore be well served by having
the confidence of their convictions and presenting these alternatives
in a balanced manner that would allow customers to evaluate the
products before making any purchase.
Managing customer expectations through this form of in
formed consent230 is not necessarily intended to totally eliminate
possible suitability claims. Reasonably prudent customers should
bear the ultimate financial consequences when their educated in
vestment decisions turn out other than expected. 231 The threat of
229. This point is exemplified by NTM 99-35, supra note 11, and NTM 00-44,
supra note 10, at 301-02, which both warn producers that they must have a thorough
knowledge of the specifications of each variable product recommended. IMSA Princi
ple 2, Code D also requires that producers have "adequate knowledge" of products and
their operation. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 56. See generally
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that for a registered repre
sentative to have the requisite reasonable basis for believing that a particular security is
appropriate for any investor, the broker-dealer must have performed due diligence on
the security); In re F. J. Kaufman & Co., 50 S.E.C. 164 (1989) (requiring producers to
know their "transaction" as well as their customer); Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d
527 (N.J. 1991) (quoting Rider v. Lynch, 201 A.2d 561 (N.J. 1964».
230. See NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302--03; NASD Investors' Best Practices
(unsuitability), available at http://www.nasdr.com:80/4300_page_2.htm.
231. See Booth, supra note 9, at 1605.
[T)he question remains how to distinguish cases of genuine broker misbehav
ior from cases in which the investor has lost fair and square. After all, invest
ing is risky business and, therefore, investors should expect to lose sometimes.
A broker cannot be expected to insure success. Thus, mere mistakes of judg
ment should not suffice to allow investor recovery even if the requisite rela
tionship of trust and confidence can be shown . . ..
. . . . [A)n investor may be disserved when the broker causes the investor to
take on additional risk absent a clear decision by the investor to do so, or at
the very least, the informed consent of the investor. In other words, the bro
ker should be liable when the broker increases the risk level of an investor's
portfolio without at least the consent of the investor.
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exposure; however, should continue to loom for those producers
who take advantage of the asymmetry of knowledge between them
and their customer, as well as in those instances in which an over
bearing producer implicitly or explicitly induces (i.e., over-sells) the
product based on his or her overt actions, course of ~onduct, or
prior history with the customer.
CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, given the tenor of the debate thus far, it is
highly improbable that the financial services industry will embrace
a universal standard that harmonizes existing suitability standards.
More likely, the insurance industry and the NAIC will continue to
debate a model regulation that ignores securities law suitability
standards for reasons such as: (a) the fundamental differences that
exist between variable and traditional products as to perceptions
about risk; (b) the infungibility of "needs" t6 be considered; (c) the
existence of other market conduct protections; and (d) the fact that
using a "recommendation" as the trigger for applying standards is
too vague. 232 Ironically, securities and banking regulators could ul
timately force a standard upon the insurance industry through the
broad powers vested under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACt. 233 In the
end, the insurance industry's failure to reach consensus may lead to
Id. (footnotes omitted).
232. See, e.g., Steven Brostoff, NAIC and Legislators Vow: No NARAB, in NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALlH 1 (Apr. 17, 2000); Letter from Ronald J. Panneton,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. and Financial Advisors, to Carolyn J. Johnson
(Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author). It has also been argued that state insurance depart
ment approval of certain policy forms mitigates the need for a suitability requirement
presumably on the assumption that the insurance commissioner would not approve
anti-consumer products. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. DEPT., supra note 40, at 7; Letter from
Donald J. Walters to Carolyn J. Johnson, supra note 41, at 2.
233. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also evidences disparate deference to federal or state securi
ties on one hand, and state insurance regulators on the other. See generally id.
§ 104(f)(-1) (preserving the absolute jurisdiction of securities commissions to prevent
fraud and oversee licensure or registration of brokers, dealers, and investment advi
sors); id. § 104(f)(2) (preserving the jurisdiction of state blue sky, corporate, and anti
trust regulators provided such laws or actions were not "inconsistent with the purposes
of this Act"); id. § 305(g)(1)(B) (providing that state insurance regulatory authority is
subject to federal banking agency consumer protection regulations and preemption pro
visions). Cf id. § 323 (stating that one of the purposes of NARAB, if implemented, is
to "preserv[e] the right of States to license, supervise, and discipline insurance produc
ers and to prescribe and enforce laws and regulations with regard to insurance-related
consumer protection and unfair trade practices."). But see id. § 307(a) (instructing the
Federal Reserve Board and state insurance regulators to share information in order to
encourage efficiency and quality supervision).
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forced submission of a regulatory scheme that could favor securities
brokers and bankers over insurance agents. 234
Securities suitability standards and their litigious history pro
vide many insights. Beyond their applicability to hybrid products,
these standards affirm the existence of an informed consent stan
dard where, in the proper circumstances, reasonably capable cus
tomers can assume responsibility for the outcomes of their
investment decisions. 235 Managing client expectations should not
absolve producers, as experts, from their obligation to educate their
customers about pertinent features of all recommended and other
wise available products, as well as the existence of possible conflicts
of interest. However, contrary to present practice, a process and
structure orientation to suitability would help establish a relatively
ascertainable point at the conclusion of the solicitation process. At
that time, absent discretionary authority, the producer (as well as
his or her supervisors and product manufacturers) could reasonably
conclude that he or she has conducted an appropriate and thorough
inquiry as to the customer's investment objectives, financial situa
tion, knowledge, and financial experience. The producer therefore
has a reasonable basis to believe that the customer (a) has taken
reasonable measures to evaluate the risks. associated with the rec
ommended product (in isolation and in terms of his or her overall
holdings and other products), whether individually or with the assis
tance of other qualified advisors; and (b) has the financial capability
to bear the potential consequences flowing from such purchase.
The present and future financial services industry has, and will
continue to have, a dizzying array of distribution channels for advi
sory services and products. Separate standards for each type of
product, producer, or site of sale are simply unworkable. Given the
already somewhat tarnished public image of the insurance salesper
son, it is easy to surmise why the insurance industry had better get
234. Id. § 321(b)(4); see alsO id. § 321(b)(1) (providing uniform licenSing regard
ing qualification and training of producers "in ascertaining the appropriateness tof a
particular insurance product for a prospective purchaser"). Uniform licensing require
ments that include suitability criteria may be averted if a majority of states establish
either "uniform" or "reciprocal" producer licensing provisions by November 12, 2002.
§ 321(a). According to the NAIC, 46 states have passed legislation or adopted regula
tions attempting to satisfy this requirement. If these laws and regulations have truly
established "uniform criteria" that ensures "that an insurance product ... sold to a
customer is suitable and appropriate for the customer based on financial information
disclosed by the customer," § 321(b)(4), then-in theory-a multi-state suitability stan
dard now exists.
235. See Gibson, supra note 22, at 571-81 (stating that institutional investors
should assume investment risk associated with derivatives).
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its house in order fast. Missing this historic opportunity may be the
harbinger of a new era of financial service provider "Darwinism."
In such a new world where old style insurance producer "relation
ship-ists" become extinct in favor of new style "transactional-ist"
producers, there remains the final question: Who then, if anyone,
will be his or her customer's keeper?

